2025-09-22 15:57:31
As the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) is getting closer and companies wanting to sell digital services in goods within the EU need to step up, tighten their procedures, improve their documentation and get control over their dependencies I feel it could be timely to remind everyone:
We of course offer full support and fully CRA compliant curl versions to support customers.
curl is not a manufacturer as per the legislation’s terminology so we as a project don’t have those requirements, but we always have our ducks in order and we will gladly assist and help manufacturers to comply.
We have done internet transfers for the world for decades. Fast, securely, standards compliant, feature packed and rock solid. We make curl to empower the world’s digital infrastructure.
You can rely on us.
2025-09-19 14:23:25
We are dropping support for this feature in curl 8.17.0. Kerberos5 FTP to be exact. The last Kerberos support we had for FTP.
On September 16, 2025 we received a security report that accurately identified a possible stack based buffer overflow in the Kerberos FTP code that could allow a malicious FTP server cause havoc in curl.
Yikes. That is bad.
But wait, it also identified a second problem. In the exact same commit that introduced the potential security vulnerability (by me, no less) I also injected a second bug!
This second bug effectively and completely broke the function and prevented Kerberos FTP from working. So no user would actually be vulnerable to the first problem because it simply never works anymore and no user would then use this against a malicious server!
At the time when I merged the commit this second bug was not detected because we obviously do not have tests and CI that test this piece of the code. It pains me to admit this, but we do have a few areas left in curl that aren’t covered by tests or enough tests.
I merged this bad code back in May 2024 and we have done over a year’s worth of releases since then and since not a single person has reported this breakage we can use this as a decent canary in the mine and safely conclude that not a single soul has used this feature in this time (with a recent curl install). If they did they didn’t tell us about it and I don’t count that.
With this accidental/clever user check, we have then decided to instead of fixing the code we rip the entire thing out. Clearly we should not support this code since A) it isn’t used and B) it isn’t tested in the test suite. Perhaps also C) it is weird code.
Bye bye Kerberos5 FTP support. We introduced it back in July 2007.
We had Kerberos4 support for FTP between September 2000 and August 2013.
As a follow-on effect, we also get rid of the last piece of code in the repository that were copyrighted “Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan” under a BSD-3 license. The only piece that was BSD-3 licensed. One less license to care about!
The top image is a cropped version of Cerberus and Heracles. An etching by Antonio Tempesta (Florence, Italy, 1555–1630).
2025-09-18 15:32:47
Every curl security report starts out with someone submitting an issue to us on https://hackerone.com/curl. The reporter tells us what they suspect and what they think the problem is. This report is kept private, visible only to the curl security team and the reporter while we work on it.
In recent months we have gotten 3-4 security reports per week. The program has run for over six years now, with almost 600 reports accumulated.
On average, someone in the team makes a first response to that report already within the first hour.
The curl security team right now consists of seven long time and experienced curl maintainers. We immediately start to analyze and assess the received issue and its claims. Most reports are not identifying actual security problems and are instead quickly dismissed and closed. Some of them identify plain bugs that are not security issues and then we move the discussion over to the public bug tracker instead.
This part can take anything from hours up to multiple days and usually involves several curl security team members.
If we think the issue might have merit, we ask follow-up questions, test reproducible code and discuss with the reporter.
A small fraction of the incoming reports is actually considered valid security vulnerabilities. We work together with the reporter to reach a good understanding of what exactly is required for the bug to trigger and what the flaw can lead to. Together we set a severity for the problem (low, medium, high, critical) and we work out a first patch – which also helps to make sure we understand the issue. Unless the problem is deemed serious we tend to sync the publication of the new vulnerability with the pending next release. Our normal release cycle is eight weeks so we are never farther than 56 days away from the next release.
For security issues we deem to be severity low or medium we create a pull request for the problem in the public repository – but we don’t mention the security angle of the problem in the public communication of it. This way, we also make sure that the fix gets added test exposure and time to get polished before the pending next release. Over the last five or so years, only two in about eighty confirmed security vulnerabilities have been rated a higher severity than medium. Fixes for vulnerabilities we consider to be severity high or critical are instead merged into the git repository when there is approximately 48 hours left to the pending release – to limit the exposure time before it is announced properly. We need to merge it into the public before the release because our entire test infrastructure and verification system is based on public source code.
Next, we write up a detailed security advisory that explains the problem and exactly what the mistake is and how it can lead to something bad – including all the relevant details we can think of. This includes version ranges for affected curl versions and the exact git commits that introduced the problem as well as which commit that fixed the issue – plus credits to the reporter and to the patch author etc. We have the ambition to provide the best security advisories you can find in the industry. (We also provide them in JSON format etc on the site for the rare few users who care about that.) We of course want the original reporter involved as well so that we make sure that we get all the angles of the problem covered accurately.
As we are a CNA (CVE Numbering Authority), we reserve and manage CVE Ids for our own issues ourselves.
About a week before the pending release when we also will publish the CVE, we inform the distros@openwall mailing list about the issue, including the fix, and when it is going to be released. It gives Open Source operating systems a little time to prepare their releases and adjust for the CVE we will publish.
On the release day we publish the CVE details and we ship the release. We then also close the HackerOne report and disclose it to the world. We disclose all HackerOne reports once closed for maximum transparency and openness. We also inform all the curl mailing lists and the oss-security mailing list about the new CVE. Sometimes we of course publish more than one CVE for the same release.
Once the HackerOne report is closed and disclosed to the world, the vulnerability reporter can claim a bug bounty from the Internet Bug Bounty which pays the researcher a certain amount of money based on the severity level of the curl vulnerability.
(The original text I used for this blog post was previously provided to the interview I made for Help Net Security. Tweaked and slightly extended here.)
The heroes in the curl security team who usually work on all this in silence and without much ado, are currently (in no particular order):
2025-09-14 04:37:52
Developers Day is a recent annual Swedish gala organized by the Stockholm-based company Developers Bay. This is its third year running.
They have an ambition to highlight and celebrate Swedish software developers (or perhaps it is developers based in Sweden?) and hand out a series of awards for that purpose.
A jury that consists of six persons receives nominations through-out the year and then they decide which of them who get awards in six different categories.
This year, I was graciously nominated as, and subsequently, awarded Developer of the year at the award gala on September 12, 2025.
The motivation, as shown in Swedish in the image above, translates into something like:
This year’s winner is a developer with a lifelong passion for technology and problem solving. His interest was awaken already in the 1980s with a commodore64 and has since grown into a career characterized by curiosity and drive. After starting his professional life at IBM, the developer has contributed to the open source world for a long time – both as a coder and as an ambassador for open collaboration. For this year’s winner, development is also a way to understand people and the most challenging part of technology is the collaboration between them. He created curl, one of the world’s most installed software products, with over 20 billion installations.
Getting recognition for my work and many years in software development is truly awesome and heartwarming. It energizes me and motivates me to go further. Clearly I must be doing something right!
I aspire to make top quality software entirely free and Open Source. I want to provided stellar tools and means for my fellow developers that make them productive and allow them to build awesome things. I try to explain what I do, how things work and I how I think things should be done, to perhaps in some small ways push things in the world in the appropriate direction.
Yeah, this is probably a little navel-gazing and inside baseball, as this is just a (small) company and its associated network that give out awards within a relatively small Swedish community by jury members who given their public bios do not have a terribly long or extensive experience out in the big wide world.
of the year? Yeah a quite legitimate question could be what special action or activity I have done in 2025 to earn the honor this particular time and not last year or next, but I think it simply boils down to the fact that someone nominated me this year.
Best developer? Comparing different persons working with completely different things in completely different areas and saying that one of them is “best” is certainly futile and of course not actually possible. We have numerous excellent developers in Sweden.
In spite of that, getting recognition in the form of an award is simply wonderful.
Thank you!
2025-09-10 13:49:32
Welcome to one of the more feature-packed curl releases we have had in a while. Exactly eight weeks since we shipped 8.15.0.
the 270th release
17 changes
56 days (total: 10,036)
260 bugfixes (total: 12,538)
453 commits (total: 36,025)
2 new public libcurl function (total: 98)
0 new curl_easy_setopt() option (total: 308)
3 new curl command line option (total: 272)
76 contributors, 39 new (total: 3,499)
32 authors, 17 new (total: 1,410)
2 security fixes (total: 169)
We publish two severity-low vulnerabilities in sync with this release:
We have a long range of changes this time:
--follow option
--out-null option
--parallel-max-host option to limit concurrent connections per host--retry-delay and --retry-max-time accept decimal seconds--longopt=value
NETRC environment variable (first) if setThe official bugfix count surpassed 250 this cycle and we have documented them all in the changelog, including links to most issues or pull-requests where they originated.
See the release presentation for a walk-through of some of the perhaps most interesting ones.
2025-09-09 14:57:52
One of these mantras I keep repeating is how we in the curl project keep improving, keep polishing and keep tightening every bolt there is. No one can do everything right from day one, but given time and will we can over time get a lot of things lined up in neat and tidy lines.
And yet new things creep up all the time that can be improved and taken yet a little further.
Back in the spring of 2025 we had an exercise at our curl up meeting in Prague. Jim Fuller played up an imaginary life-like scenario for a bunch of curl maintainers. In this role played major incident we got to consider how we would behave and what we would do in the curl project if something like Heartbleed or a serious breach occur.
It was a little of an eye opener for several of us. We realized we should probably get some more details written down and planned for.
We of course arrange for things and work on procedures and practices to the best of our abilities to make sure that there will never be any such major incident in the curl project. However, as we are all human and we all do mistakes, it would be foolish to think that we are somehow immune against incidents of the highest possible severity level. Rationally, we should just accept the fact that even though the risk is ideally really slim, it exists. It could happen.
We have now documented some guidelines about what exactly constitutes a major incident, how it is declared, some roles we need to shoulder while it is ongoing, with a focus on both internal and external communication, and how we declare that the incident has ended. It’s straight forward and quite simple.
Feel free to criticize or improve those if you find omissions or mistakes. I imagine that if we ever get to actually use these documented steps because of such a project-shaking event, we will get reasons to improve it. Until then we just need to apply our imagination and make sure it seems reasonable.
