2025-09-17 21:00:43
Great founders shine in a crisis.
Ordinary ones watch their companies burn down.
I just had coffee with two co-founders of an e-bike company who were mentoring one of our student teams. In short order I realized they were great founders – creative, agile and still having fun building their company. Unlike other e-bike rental companies, their business model was unique, offering riders free rental time in exchange for looking at ads. We had a great conversation, and they talked about everything – except the dead moose on the table.
The Dead Moose
Before we met, I read they had just lost out to three other e-bike companies (including Uber) to operate in another major city. This meant they were now shut out of that market for the next four years. Being fourth in a group of three is painful, but good CEOs learn from failure and ensure that those lessons get baked in going forward so they never happen again. (And if not, their board hits them on the head until they do.) As we talked, I learned that wasn’t the case with these founders.
They casually mentioned they were again competing for the rights to operate in a major city, this time the one I was in.
I asked what I thought were obvious questions, starting with, “What did you learn from the loss? What did you change to ensure it won’t happen again?” And to me, most important, “What happens to your valuation and business if you lose this city?” The answers were vague, and if I had been on their board would have given me pause. (That’s a polite description of what I would have said.)
A Crisis – Ignored
While the founders were still talking about new product offerings, brand partnerships, and customer acquisition programs, they hadn’t processed what their past loss meant, and the potential consequences of losing this next city. Let alone that they were now in a life-and-death struggle for the survival of their company. If not for survival, at least in a fight for one- or two-orders of magnitude difference in their valuation.
The CEO just didn’t have the urgency of what would happen if they lost this next city selection. Having seen this movie before, I suggested that they needed to treat this competition as a four-alarm fire. This was a crisis, and they were treating it like any other day-to-day issue.
Recognize When It’s Not Business As Usual
Startups are inherently chaotic. Founders face a constant barrage of decisions, demands, and distractions. But they need to recognize when an event/outcome can have an order of magnitude/life or death impact on their company. When a crisis happens the CEO needs to marshal all resources and organize to deal with them differently than the multitude of other day-to-day “hair on fire” issues in a startup. Rather than making this “one more fire drill,” as a first step startup CEOs need to articulate why this is an existential threat to the survival of the company. I found the best way to do this is to draft a one-page memo laying out:
And unless the building is on fire, test the memo with some trusted advisors (not your exec staff or board.)
Then, the CEO needs to personally lead the response:
Lessons Learned
- A competent founder can recognize when it’s a crisis, not business as usual.
- A good founder knows how to build new skills and capacity to manage a crisis.
- A great founder already has a plan B in place.
- In a crisis if you can’t manage chaos and uncertainty, if you can’t bias yourself for action and if instead you wait around for someone else to tell you what to do, then your investors and competitors will make your decisions for you and/or you will run out of money and your company will die.
2025-09-10 21:00:06
Announcing the 2025 edition of the DoW PEO Directory. Online here.
Think of this PEO Directory as a “Who buys in the government?” phone book.
Finding a customer for your product in the Department of War is hard: Who should you talk to? How do you get their attention? What is the right Go-To-Market Strategy? What is a PEO and why should I care?
Ever since I co-founded Hacking for Defense, my students would ask, “Who should we call in the DoW to let them know what problem we solved? How can we show them the solution we built?” In the last few years that question kept coming, from new defense startups and their investors.
At the same time, I’d get questions from the new wave of Defense Investors asking, “What’s the best “Go-To-Market (GTM)” strategy for our startups?
PEOs, PMs, PIAs, PoRs, Consortia, SBIRs, OTAs, CSOs, FAR, CUI, SAM, CRADAs, Primes, Mid-tier Integrators, Tribal/ANC Firms, Direct-to-Operator, Direct-to-Field Units, Labs, DD-254… For a startup it’s an entirely new language, new buzzwords, new partners, new rules and it requires a new “Go-To-Market (GTM)” strategy.
How to Work With the DoW
Below are simplified diagrams of two of the many paths for how a startup can get funding and revenue from the Department of War. The first example, the Patient Capital Path, illustrates a startup without a working product. They travel the traditional new company journey through the DoW processes.
The second example, the Impatient Capital Path, illustrates a startup with an MVP and/or working product. They ignore the traditional journey through the DoW process and go directly to the warfighter in the field. With the rise of Defense Venture Capital, this “swing-for-the fences” full-speed ahead approach is a Lean Startup approach to become a next generation Prime.
(Note that in 2025 selling to the DoW is likely to change – for the better.)
Selling to the DoW takes time, but a well-executed defense strategy can lead to billion-dollar contracts, sustained revenue, and technological impact at a national scale. Existing defense contractors know who these DoW organizations are and have teams of people tracking budgets and contracts. They know the path to getting an order from the Department of War. But startups?
Why Write the PEO Directory?
Most startups don’t have a clue where to start. And selling to the Department of War is unlike any enterprise or B-to-B sales process founders and their investors may be familiar with. Compared to the commercial world, the language is different, the organizations are different, the culture of risk taking (in acquisition) is different, and most importantly the go-to-market strategy is completely different.
Amazingly, until last year’s first edition of the PEO directory there wasn’t a DoW-wide phone book available to startups to identify who to call in the War Department. This lack of information made sense in a world where the DoW and its suppliers were a closely knit group who knew each other and technology innovation was happening at a sedate decades-long pace. (And assumed our adversaries didn’t have access to our DoW web pages, LinkedIn and ChatGPT.)
That’s no longer true. Given the rapid pace of innovation outside the DoW, and new vendors in UAS, counter UAS, autonomy, AI, quantum, biotech, et al, this lack of transparency is now an obstacle to a whole-of-nation approach to delivering innovation to the warfighter.
(This lack of information even extends internally to the DoW. I’ve started receiving requests from staff at multiple Combatant Commands for access to the PEO Directory. Why? Because “…it would be powerful to include a database of PEOs to link to our database of Requirements, Gaps, and Tracked Technologies to specific PEOs to call.”)
This is a classic case of information asymmetry, and it’s not healthy for either the increasingly urgent needs of the Department of War or the nascent startup defense ecosystem.
Our adversaries have had a whole-of-nation approach to delivering innovation to the warfighter in place for decades. This is our contribution to help the DoW compete.
2025 PEO Directory Edition Notes
The first edition of this document started solely as a PEO directory. Its emphasis was (and is) the value of a startup talking to PEOs early is to get signals on what warfighter problems to solve and whether the DoW will buy their product now or in the future. Those early conversations answer the questions of “Is there a need?” and “Is there a market?”
This 2025 edition of the PEO Directory attempts to capture the major changes that are occurring in the DoW – in organizations, in processes and in people. (For example, the PEO offices of the three largest new defense acquisition programs — Golden Dome, Sentinel and Columbia – will report directly to the Deputy Secretary of War, rather than to their respective Services. And the SecWar killed the cumbersome JCIDIS requirements process.)
What this means is that in 2025 the DoW will develop a new requirements and acquisition process that will identify the most urgent operational problems facing the U.S. military, work with industry earlier in the process, then rapidly turn those into fielded solutions. (That also means the Go-to-market description, people and organizations in this document will be out of date, and why we plan to update it regularly.)
What’s New?
This 2025 edition now includes as an introduction, a 30-page tutorial for startups on how the DoW buys and the various acquisition and funding processes and programs that exist for startups. It provides details on how to sell to the DoW and where the Program Executive Offices (PEOs) fit into that process.
The Directory now also includes information about the parts of the government and the regulations that influence how the DoW buys – the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). It added new offices such as Golden Dome Direct Reporting Program, DIU, AFRL, DARPA, MDA, CDAO, OSC, IQT, Army Transformation and Training Command, SOCOM, and others.
To help startups understand the DoW, for each service we added links to the organization, structure, and language, as well as a list of each Service’s General Officers/Flag Officers.
Appendix B has a linked spreadsheet with the names in this document.
Appendix C has a list of Venture Capital firms, Corporate Investors, Private Equity firms and Government agencies who invest in Defense. In addition, the Appendix includes details about the various DoW SBIR programs, a list of OTA Consortia, Partnership Intermediary Agreement (PIA) Organizations, and Tribal/Alaska Native Corporation (ANC) Companies.
Appendix D now lists and links to the military and state FFRDC test centers where startups can conduct demos and test equipment.
Appendix E added a list and links of Defense Publications and Defense Trade Shows.
Appendix F has a list of all Army system contractors.
A few reminders:
Thanks to this year’s partners helping to maintain and host the Directory: Stanford Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation, America’s Frontier Fund and BMNT.
This edition of the PEO Directory is on-line so it can be updated as the latest changes become available.
Send updates and corrections to [email protected]
You can access and download the full document here.
2025-07-08 21:00:00
How did you go bankrupt?”
Two ways. Gradually, then suddenly.”
Ernest Hemingway, The Sun Also Rises
Every disruptive technology since the fire and the wheel have forced leaders to adapt or die. This post tells the story of what happened when 4,000 companies faced a disruptive technology and why only one survived.
In the early 20th century, the United States was home to more than 4,000 carriage and wagon manufacturers. They were the backbone of mobility and the precursors of automobiles, used for personal transportation, goods delivery, military logistics, public transit, and more. These companies employed tens of thousands of workers and formed the heart of an ecosystem of blacksmiths, wheelwrights, saddle makers, stables, and feed suppliers.
And within two decades, they were gone. Only 1 company out of 4,000 carriage and wagon makers pivoted to automobiles.
Today, this story feels uncannily familiar. Just as the carriage industry watched the automobile evolve from curiosity to dominance, modern companies in SaaS, media, software, logistics, defense and education are watching AI emerge from novelty into existential threat.
A Comfortable Industry Misses the Turn
In 1900, the U.S. was the global leader in building carriages. South Bend, IN; Flint, MI; and Cincinnati, Ohio, were full of factories producing carriages, buggies, and wagons. On the high-end these companies made beautifully crafted vehicles, largely from wood and leather, hand-built by artisans. Others were more basic wagons for hauling goods.
When early automobiles began appearing in the 1890’s — first steam-powered, then electric, then gasoline –most carriage and wagon makers dismissed them. Why wouldn’t they? The first cars were:
Early autos were worse on most key dimensions that mattered to customers. Clayton Christensen’s “Innovator’s Dilemma” described this perfectly – disruption begins with inferior products that incumbents don’t take seriously. But beneath that dismissiveness was something deeper: identity and hubris. Carriage manufacturers saw themselves not as transportation companies, but as craftsmen of elegant, horse-drawn vehicles. Cars weren’t an evolution—they were heresy. And so, they waited. And watched. And went out of business slowly and then all of a sudden.
Early Autos Were Niche and Experimental (1890s–1905) The first cars (steam, electric, and early gas) were expensive, unreliable, and slow. They were built by 19th century mechanical nerds. And the few that were sold were considered toys for other nerds and the rich. (Carl Benz patented the first internal combustion engine in 1886. In 1893 Frank Duryea drove the first car in the U.S.)
These early cars coexisted with a massive horse-powered economy. Horses pulled wagons, delivered goods, powered streetcars, and people. The first automakers used the only design they knew: the carriage. Drivers sat up high like they did in a carriage when they had to see over the horses.
For the first 15 years carriage makers, teamsters, and stable owners saw no immediate threat. Like AI today: autos were powerful, new, buggy, unreliable and not yet mainstream.
Disruption Begins (1905–1910) 10 years after their first appearance, gasoline cars became more practical, they had better engines, rubber tires, and municipalities had begun to pave roads. From 1903 to 1908 Ford shipped 9 different models of cars as they experimented with what we would call today minimum viable products. Ford (and General Motors) broke away from their carriage legacies and began designing cars from first principles, optimized for speed, safety, mass production, and modern materials. That’s the moment the car became its own species. Until then, it was still mostly a carriage with a motor. Urban elites switched from carriages to autos for status and speed, and taxis, delivery fleets, and wealthy commuters adopted cars in major cities.
Even with evidence staring them in the face, carriage companies still did not pivot, assuming cars were a fad. For carriage companies this was the “denial and drift” phase of disruption.
The Tipping Point: Ford’s Model T and Mass Production (1908–1925) The Ford Model T introduced in 1908 was affordable ($825 to as little as $260 by the 1920s), durable and easy to repair, and made using assembly line mass production. Within 15 years tens of millions of Americans owned cars. Horse-related businesses — not only the carriage makers, but the entire ecosystem of blacksmiths, stables, and feed suppliers — began collapsing. Cities banned horses from downtown areas due to waste, disease, and congestion. This was like the arrival of Google, the iPhone or ChatGPT: a phase shift.
Collapse of the Old Ecosystem (1920s–1930s) Between 1900 and 1930 U.S. horse population fell from 21 million to 10 million and the carriage and buggy production plummeted. New infrastructure—roads, gas stations, driver licensing, traffic laws—was built around the car, not the horse.
Early automakers borrowed heavily from carriage design (1885–1910). Cars emerged in a world dominated by horse-drawn vehicles and they inherited the materials and mechanical designs from the coach builders.
– Leaf springs were the dominant suspension in 19th-century carriages. Early cars used the same.
– There were no shock absorbers in carriages, and early autos. They both relied on leaf spring damping, making them bouncy and unstable at speed. Why? Roads were terrible. Speeds were low. Coachbuilders understood how to make wagons survive cobblestones and dirt.
– Carriages used solid steel or wooden axles; early cars did the same.
Body Construction and Design Borrowed from Carriages
– Car bodies were wood framed with steel or aluminum sheathing, like a carriage.
– Upholstery, leatherwork, and ornamentation were also carried over.
– Terms like roadster, phaeton, landaulet, and brougham are directly inherited from carriage types.
– High seating and narrow track: Early cars had tall wheels and high ground clearance, like buggies and carriages, since early roads were rutted and muddy.
Result: Early automobiles looked like carriages without the horse, because they were, functionally and structurally, carriages with engines bolted on.
What Changed Over Time
As speeds increased and roads improved, wood carriage design couldn’t handle the torsional stress of faster, heavier cars. Leaf-spring suspensions were too crude for speed and handling. Car builders began using pressed steel bodies (Fisher Body’s breakthrough), independent front suspension (introduced in the 1930s), finally integrating the car body and chassis into a single, unified structure, rather than having a separate body and frame (in the 1930s–40s).
Studebaker: From Horses to Horsepower
The one carriage maker who did not go out of business and became an automobile company was Studebaker. Founded in 1852 in South Bend, IN, Studebaker began by building wagons for farmers and pioneers heading west. They supplied wagons to the Union Army during the Civil War and became the largest wagon manufacturer in the world by the late 19th century. But unlike its peers, Studebaker made a series of early, strategic bets on the future.
In 1902, they began producing electric vehicles—a cautious but forward-thinking move. Two years later, in 1904, they entered the gasoline car business, at first by contracting out the engine and chassis. Eventually, they began making the entire car themselves.
Studebaker understood two things the other 4,000 carriage companies ignored:
Studebaker made the painful shift in manufacturing, retooled their factories, and retrained their workforce. By the 1910s, they were a full-fledged car company.
Studebaker survived long into the auto age—longer than most of the early automakers—and only stopped making cars in 1966.
Fisher Body: A Coach Builder for the Machine Age
While Studebaker made a direct pivot of their entire company from carriage to cars, a case can be made that Fisher Body was a spinoff. Founded in 1908 in Detroit by brothers Fred and Charles Fisher, the Fishers had worked at a carriage firm before starting their own auto-body business. They specialized in producing the car bodies, not an entire car. Their key innovation was making closed steel car bodies which was a major improvement over open carriages and wood frames. By 1919, Fisher was so successful that General Motors bought a controlling stake and in 1926, GM acquired them entirely. For decades, “Body by Fisher” was stamped into millions of GM cars.
Durant-Dort: The Origin of General Motors
While the Durant-Dort Carriage Company never made cars itself, its co-founder William C. (Billy) Durant saw what others didn’t. See the blog posts on Durant’s adventures here and here. 
Durant used the fortune he made in carriages to invest in the burgeoning auto industry. He founded Buick in 1904 and in 1908 set up General Motors. Acting like one of Silicon Valley’s crazy entrepreneurs, he rapidly acquired Oldsmobile, Cadillac, and 11 other car companies and 10 parts/accessory companies, creating the first auto conglomerate. (In 1910 Durant would be fired by his board. Undeterred, Durant founded Chevrolet, took it public and in 1916 did a hostile takeover of GM and fired the board. He got thrown out again by his new board in 1920 and died penniless managing a bowling alley.)
While his financial overreach eventually cost him control of GM, his vision reshaped American manufacturing. General Motors became the largest car company in the 20th century.
Why the Other 3,999 Carriage makers Didn’t Make It
Most carriage makers didn’t have a William Durant, a Fisher brother, or a Studebaker in the boardroom. Here’s why they failed:
By 1925, out of the 4,000+ carriage companies in operation around 1900, nearly all were gone.
The tragedy of the carriage era and lessons for today
What does an early 20th century disruption have to do with AI and today’s companies? Plenty. The lessons are timeless and relevant for today’s CEOs and boards.
It wasn’t just that carriage companies failed to pivot. It’s that they had time and customers—and still missed it. That same pattern happens at every disruptive transition; they were led by CEOs who simply couldn’t imagine a different world than the one they had mastered. (This happened when companies had to master the web, mobile and social media, and is repeating today with AI.)
Carriage company Presidents were tied to sales and increasing revenue. The threat to their business from cars seemed far in the future. That was true for two decades until the bottom dropped out of their market with the rapid adoption of autos, with the introduction of the Ford Model T. Today, CEO compensation is tied to quarterly earnings, not long-term reinvention. Most boards are packed with risk-averse fiduciaries, not builders or technologists. They reward share buybacks, not AI moonshots. The real problem isn’t that companies can’t see the future. It’s that they are structurally disincentivized to act on it. Meanwhile, disruption doesn’t wait for board approval.
If you’re a CEO, you’re not just managing a P&L. You are deciding whether your company will be the Studebaker—or one of the other 3,999.
2025-07-01 21:00:38
Founders with great businesses are often frustrated that they can’t raise money.
Here’s why.
I’ve been having coffee with lots of frustrated founders (my students and others) bemoaning most VCs won’t even meet with them unless they have AI in their fundraising pitch. And the AI startups they see are getting valuations that appear nonsensical. These conversations brought back a sense of Déjà vu from the Dot Com bubble (at the turn of this century), when if you didn’t have internet as part of your pitch you weren’t getting funded.
I realized that most of these founders were simply confused, thinking that a good business was of interest to VCs. When in fact VCs are looking for extraordinary businesses that can generate extraordinary returns.
In the U.S., startups raising money from venture capitalists are one of the engines that has driven multiple waves of innovation – from silicon, to life sciences, to the internet, and now to AI. However, one of the most frustrating things for founders who have companies with paying customers to see is other companies with no revenue or questionable technology raise enormous sums of cash from VCs.
Why is that? The short answer is that the business model for most venture capital firms is not to build profitable companies, nor is it to build companies in the national interest. VCs’ business model and financial incentives are to invest in companies and markets that will make the most money for their investors. (If they happen to do the former that’s a byproduct, not the goal.) At times that has them investing in companies and sectors that won’t produce useful products or may cause harm but will generate awesome returns (e.g. Juul, and some can argue social media.)
Founders looking to approach VCs for investment need to understand the four forces that influence how and where VCs invest:
1) how VCs make money, 2) the Lemming Effect, 3) the current economic climate and 4) Secondaries.
How VCs Make Money
Just a reminder of some of the basics of venture capital. Venture is a just another financial asset class – with riskier investments that potentially offer much greater returns. A small number of a VC investments will generate 10x to 100x return to make up for the losses or smaller returns from other companies. The key idea is that most VCs are looking for potential homeruns, not small (successful?) businesses.
Venture capital firms are run by general partners who raise money from limited partners (pension funds, endowments, sovereign wealth funds, high-net-worth individuals.) These limited partners expect a 3x net multiple on invested capital (MOIC) over 10 years, which translates to a 20–30% net internal rate of return (IRR). After 75 years of venture investing VC firms still can’t pick which individual company will succeed so they invest in a portfolio of startups.
VCs seesaw between believing that a winning investment strategy is access to the hottest deals (think social media a decade ago, AI today), versus others believing in the skill of finding and investing in non-obvious winners (Amazon, Airbnb, SpaceX, Palantir.) 
The ultimate goal of a VC investment is to achieve a successful “exit,” such as an Initial Public Offering (IPO) or acquisition, or today on a secondary, where they can sell their shares at a significant profit. Therefore, the metrics for their startups was to create the highest possible market cap(italization). A goal was to have a startup become a “unicorn” having a market cap of $1billion or more.
The Lemming Effect
VCs most often invest as a pack. Once a “brand-name” VC invests in a sector others tend to follow. Do they somehow all see a disruptive opportunity at the same time, or is it Fear Of Missing Out (FOMO)? (It was years after my company Rocket Science Games folded that my two investors admitted that they invested because they needed a multi-media game company in their portfolio.) Earlier in this century the VC play was fuel cells, climate, food delivery, scooters, social media, crypto, et al. Today, it’s defense and AI startups. Capital floods in when the sector is hot and dries up when the hype fades or a big failure occurs.
The current economic climate
In the 20th century the primary path for liquidity for a VC investment in a startup (the way they turned their stock ownership in a startup into dollars) meant having the company “go public” via an initial public offering (IPO) on a U.S. stock exchange. Back then underwriters required that the company had a track record of increasing revenue and profit, and a foreseeable path to do so in the next year. Having your company bought just before the IPO was a tactic for a quick exit but was most often the last resort at a fire sale price if an IPO wasn’t possible.
Beginning with the Netscape IPO in 1995 and through 2000, the public markets began to have an appetite for Internet startups with no revenue or profits. These promised the next wave of disruption. The focus in this area became eyeballs and clicks versus revenue. Most of these companies crashed and burned in the dotcom crash and nuclear winter of 2001-2003, but VC who sold at the IPO or shortly after made money.
For the last two decades IPO windows have briefly opened (although intermittently) for startups with no hope for meaningful revenue, profit or even deliverable products (fusion, quantum, etc. heavy, infrastructure-scale moonshots that require decades to fruition). Yet with company and investor PR, hype and the public’s naivete about deep technology these companies raised money, their investors sold out and the public was left hanging with stock of decreasing value.
Today, the public markets are mostly closed for startup IPOs. That means that venture capital firms have money tied up in startups that are illiquid. They have to think about other ways to get their money from their startup investments.
Secondaries
Today with the Initial Public Offering path for liquidity for VCs mostly closed, secondaries have emerged as a new way for venture firms and their limited partners to make money.
Secondaries allow existing investors (and employees) to sell stock they already own – almost always at a higher price than their purchase price. These are not new shares and don’t dilute the existing investors. (Some VC funds can sell a stake in their entire fund if they want an early exit.) Secondaries offer VC funds a way to take money off the table and reduce their exposure.
The game here is that startups and their investors need to continually hype/promote their startup to increase the company’s perceived value. The new investors – later stage funds, growth equity firms, hedge funds or dedicated secondary funds, now have to do the same to make money on the secondary shares they’ve purchased.
What Do These Forces Mean For Founders?
- Most VCs care passionately about the industry they invest in. And if they invest in you they will do anything to help your company succeed.
- However, you need to remember their firm is a business.
- While they might like you, think you are extraordinarily talented, they are giving you money to make a lot more money for themselves and their investors (their limited partners.)
- See my painful lesson here when I learned the difference between VC’s liking you, versus their fiduciary duty to make money.
- The minute you take money from someone their business model becomes yours.
- If you don’t understand the financial engineering model a VC firm is operating under, you’re going to be an ex CEO.
- You need to understand the time horizon, size, scale of the returns they are looking for.
- Some companies, while great businesses may not be venture fundable.
- Can yours provide a 10 to 100x return? Is it in (or can it create) a large $1B market?
- VC funds tend to look for a return in 7-10 years.
- Is your team extraordinary and coachable?
- VCs tend to be either followers into hot deals and sectors or are looking for undiscovered big ideas.
- Understand which type of investor you are talking to. Some firms have a consistent strategy; in others there may be different partners with contrary opinions.
- Storytelling matters. Not only does it matter, but it’s an integral part of the venture capital game.
- If you cannot tell a great credible story that matches the criteria for a venture scale investment you’re not ready to be a venture funded CEO.
- If you’re lucky enough to have an AI background, grab the golden ring. It won’t be there forever.
2025-06-24 21:00:26
The PowerPoints embedded in this post are best viewed on steveblank.com
We just finished the 15th<>annual Lean LaunchPad class at Stanford. The class had gotten so popular that in 2021 we started teaching it in both the winter and spring sessions.
During the 2025 spring quarter the eight teams spoke to 935 potential customers, beneficiaries and regulators. Most students spent 15-20 hours a week on the class, about double that of a normal class.
This Class Launched a Revolution in Teaching Entreprenurship
This class was designed to break out of the “how to write a business plan” as the capstone of entrepreneurial education. A business plan assumed that all startups needed to was to write a plan, raise money and then execute the plan. We overturned that orthodoxy when we pointed out that while existing organizations execute business models, startups are searching for them. And that a startup was a temporary organization designed to search for a repeatable and scaleable business model. This class was designed to teach startups how to search for a business model.
Several government-funded programs have adopted this class at scale. The first was in 2011 when we turned this syllabus into the curriculum for the National Science Foundation I-Corps. Errol Arkilic, the then head of commercialization at the National Science Foundation, adopted the class saying, “You’ve developed the scientific method for startups, using the Business Model Canvas as the laboratory notebook.”
Below are the Lessons Learned presentations from the spring 2025 Lean LaunchPad.
Team Cowmeter – early detection of cow infections through biological monitoring of milk.
If you can see the Team Cowmeter presentation click here
I-Corps at the National Institute of Health
In 2013 I partnered with UCSF and the National Institute of Health to offer the Lean LaunchPad class for Life Science and Healthcare (therapeutics, diagnostics, devices and digital health.) In 2014, in conjunction with the National Institute of Health, I took the UCSF curriculum and developed and launched the I-Corps @ NIH program.
Team NowPilot – AI copilot for enhancing focus and executive function.
If you can’t see the Team NowPilot presentation click here
I-Corps at Scale
I-Corps is now offered in 100 universities and has trained over 9,500 scientists and engineers; 7,800 participants in 2,546 teams at I-Corps at NSF (National Science Foundation), 950 participants in 317 teams at I-Corps at NIH, and 580 participants in 188 teams at Energy I-Corps (at the DOE). 15 universities in Japan now teach the class.
Team Godela – AI physics engine – with a first disruptive market in packaging.
If you can’t see the Team Godela presentation click here
$4 billion in Venture Capital For I-Corps Teams
1,380 of the NSF I-Corps teams launched startups raising $3.166 billion. Over 300 I-Corps at NIH teams have collectively raised $634 million. Energy I-Corps teams raised $151 million in additional funding.
Team ProspectAI – An AI sales development agent for lean sales teams.
If you can’t see the Team ProspectAI presentation click here
Mission Driven Entreprenurship
In 2016, I co-created both the Hacking for Defense course with Pete Newell and Joe Felter as well as the Hacking for Diplomacy course with Jeremy Weinstein at Stanford. In 2022, Steve Weinstein created Hacking for Climate and Sustainability. In 2024 Jennifer Carolan launched Hacking for Education at Stanford.
Team VLAB – accelerating clinical trials with AI orchestration of data.
If you can’t see the team VLAB presentation click here
Design of This Class
While the Lean LaunchPad students are experiencing what appears to them to be a fully hands-on, experiential class, it’s a carefully designed illusion. In fact, it’s highly structured. The syllabus has been designed so that we are offering continual implicit guidance, structure, and repetition. This is a critical distinction between our class and an open-ended experiential class. Guidance, Direction and Structure –
For example, students start the class with their own initial guidance – they believe they have an idea for a product or service (Lean LaunchPad/I-Corps) or have been given a clear real-world problem (Hacking for Defense). Coming into the class, students believe their goal is to validate their commercialization or deployment hypotheses. (The teaching team knows that over the course of the class, students will discover that most of their initial hypotheses are incorrect.)
Team Blix – IRB clinical trial compliance / A control layer for AI governance for financial services.
If you can’t see the team Blix presentation click here
The Business Model Canvas
The business model / mission model canvas offers students guidance, explicit direction, and structure. First, the canvas offers a complete, visual roadmap of all the hypotheses they will need to test over the entire class. Second, the canvas helps the students goal-seek by visualizing what an optimal endpoint would look like – finding product/market fit. Finally, the canvas provides students with a map of what they learn week-to-week through their customer discovery work. I can’t overemphasize the important role of the canvas. Unlike an incubator or accelerator with no frame, the canvas acts as the connective tissue – the frame – that students can fall back on if they get lost or confused. It allows us to teach the theory of how to turn an idea, need, or problem into commercial practice, week by week a piece at a time.
Team Plotline – A smart marketing calendar for author’s book launch.
If you can’t see the team Plotline presentation click here
Lean LaunchPad Tools
The tools for customer discovery (videos, sample experiments, etc.) offer guidance and structure for students to work outside the classroom. The explicit goal of 10-15 customer interviews a week along with the requirement for building a continual series of minimal viable products provides metrics that track the team’s progress. The mandatory office hours with the instructors and support from mentors provide additional guidance and structure.
Team Eluna/Driftnet – Data Center data aggregation and energy optimization software.
If you can’t see the team Eluna/Driftnet presentation click here
AI Embedded in the Class
This was the first year where all teams used AI to help create their business model canvas, build working MVPs in hours, generate customer questions, analyze and summarizing interviews.
It Takes A Village
While I authored this blog post, this class is a team project. The secret sauce of the success of the Lean LaunchPad at Stanford is the extraordinary group of dedicated volunteers supporting our students in so many critical ways.
The teaching team consisted of myself and:
Our teaching assistants this year were Arthur C. Campello, Anil Yildiz, Abu B. Rogers and Tireni Ajilore.
Mentors helped the teams understand if their solutions could be a commercially successful business. Thanks to Jillian Manus, Dave Epstein, Robert Feldman, Bobby Mukherjee, Kevin Ray, Deirdre Clute, Robert Locke, Doug Biehn, and John Danner. Martin Saywell from the Distinguished Careers Institute joined the Blix team. The mentor team was led by Todd Basche.
Summary
While the Lean LaunchPad/I-Corps curriculum was a revolutionary break with the past, it’s not the end. In the last decade enumerable variants have emerged. The class we teach at Stanford has continued to evolve. Better versions from others will appear. AI is already having a major impact on customer discovery and validation and we had each team list the AI tools they used. And one day another revolutionary break will take us to the next level.
2025-06-17 21:00:04
The videos and PowerPoints embedded in this post are best viewed on steveblank.com
We just finished our 10th annual Hacking for Defense class at Stanford.
What a year.
Hacking for Defense, now in 70 universities, has teams of students working to understand and help solve national security problems. At Stanford this quarter the 8 teams of 41 students collectively interviewed 1106 beneficiaries, stakeholders, requirements writers, program managers, industry partners, etc. – while simultaneously building a series of minimal viable products and developing a path to deployment.
This year’s problems came from the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, CENTCOM, Space Force/Defense Innovation Unit, the FBI, IQT, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
We opened this year’s final presentations session with inspiring remarks by Joe Lonsdale on the state of defense technology innovation and a call to action for our students. During the quarter guest speakers in the class included former National Security advisor H.R. McMaster, Jim Mattis ex Secretary of Defense, John Cogbill Deputy Commander 18th Airborne Corps, Michael Sulmeyer former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy, and John Gallagher Managing Director of Cerberus Capital.
“Lessons Learned” Presentations
At the end of the quarter, each of the eight teams gave a final “Lessons Learned” presentation along with a 2-minute video to provide context about their problem. Unlike traditional demo days or Shark Tanks which are, “Here’s how smart I am, and isn’t this a great product, please give me money,” the Lessons Learned presentations tell the story of each team’s 10-week journey and hard-won learning and discovery. For all of them it’s a roller coaster narrative describing what happens when you discover that everything you thought you knew on day one was wrong and how they eventually got it right.
While all the teams used the Mission Model Canvas, Customer Development and Agile Engineering to build Minimal Viable Products, each of their journeys was unique.
This year we had the teams add two new slides at the end of their presentation: 1) tell us which AI tools they used, and 2) their estimate of progress on the Technology Readiness Level and Investment Readiness Level.
Here’s how they did it and what they delivered.
Team Omnyra – improving visibility into AI-generated bioengineering threats.
If you can’t see the team Omnyra summary video click here
If you can’t see the Omnyra presentation click here
These are “Wicked” Problems
Wicked problems refer to really complex problems, ones with multiple moving parts, where the solution isn’t obvious and lacks a definitive formula. The types of problems our Hacking For Defense students work on fall into this category. They are often ambiguous. They start with a problem from a sponsor, and not only is the solution unclear but figuring out how to acquire and deploy it is also complex. Most often students find that in hindsight the problem was a symptom of a more interesting and complex problem – and that Acquisition of solutions in the Dept of Defense is unlike anything in the commercial world. 
And the stakeholders and institutions often have different relationships with each other – some are collaborative, some have pieces of the problem or solution, and others might have conflicting values and interests.
The figure shows the types of problems Hacking for Defense students encounter, with the most common ones shaded.
Team HydraStrike – bringing swarm technology to the maritime domain.
If you can’t see the HydraStrike summary video click here.
If you can’t see the HydraStrike presentation click here
Mission-Driven Entrepreneurship
This class is part of a bigger idea – Mission-Driven Entrepreneurship. Instead of students or faculty coming in with their own ideas, we ask them to work on societal problems, whether they’re problems for the State Department or the Department of Defense or non-profits/NGOs or the Oceans and Climate or for anything the students are passionate about. The trick is we use the same Lean LaunchPad / I-Corps curriculum — and the same class structure – experiential, hands-on– driven this time by a mission-model not a business model. (The National Science Foundation and the Common Mission Project have helped promote the expansion of the methodology worldwide.)
Mission-driven entrepreneurship is the answer to students who say, “I want to give back. I want to make my community, country or world a better place, while being challenged to solve some of the toughest problems.”
Team HyperWatch – tracking hypersonic threats.
If you can’t see the HyperWatch video click here
If you can’t see the HyperWatch presentation click here
It Started With An Idea
Hacking for Defense has its origins in the Lean LaunchPad class I first taught at Stanford in 2011. I observed that teaching case studies and/or how to write a business plan as a capstone entrepreneurship class didn’t match the hands-on chaos of a startup. Furthermore, there was no entrepreneurship class that combined experiential learning with the Lean methodology. Our goal was to teach both theory and practice. The same year we started the class, it was adopted by the National Science Foundation to train Principal Investigators who wanted to get a federal grant for commercializing their science (an SBIR grant.) The NSF observed, “The class is the scientific method for entrepreneurship. Scientists understand hypothesis testing” and relabeled the class as the NSF I-Corps (Innovation Corps). I-Corps became the standard for science commercialization for the National Science Foundation, National Institutes of Health and the Department of Energy, to date training 3,051 teams and launching 1,300+ startups.
Team ChipForce – Securing U.S. dominance in critical minerals.
If you can’t see the ChipForce video click here
If you can’t see the ChipForce presentation click here
Note: After briefing the Department of Commerce, the Chipforce was offered jobs with the department.
Origins Of Hacking For Defense
In 2016, brainstorming with Pete Newell of BMNT and Joe Felter at Stanford, we observed that students in our research universities had little connection to the problems their government was trying to solve or the larger issues civil society was grappling with. As we thought about how we could get students engaged, we realized the same Lean LaunchPad/I-Corps class would provide a framework to do so. That year we launched both Hacking for Defense and Hacking for Diplomacy (with Professor Jeremy Weinstein and the State Department) at Stanford. The Department of Defense adopted and scaled Hacking for Defense across 60 universities while Hacking for Diplomacy has been taught at Georgetown, James Madison University, Rochester Institute for Technology, University of Connecticut and now Indiana University, sponsored by the Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security (see here).
Team ArgusNet – instant geospatial data for search and rescue.
If you can’t see the ArgusNet video click here
If you can’t see the ArgusNet presentation click here
Goals for Hacking for Defense
Our primary goal for the class was to teach students Lean Innovation methods while they engaged in national public service.
In the class we saw that students could learn about the nation’s threats and security challenges while working with innovators inside the DoD and Intelligence Community. At the same time the experience would introduce to the sponsors, who are innovators inside the Department of Defense (DOD) and Intelligence Community (IC), a methodology that could help them understand and better respond to rapidly evolving threats. We wanted to show that if we could get teams to rapidly discover the real problems in the field using Lean methods, and only then articulate the requirements to solve them, defense acquisition programs could operate at speed and urgency and deliver timely and needed solutions.
Finally, we wanted to familiarize students with the military as a profession and help them better understand its expertise, and its proper role in society. We hoped it would also show our sponsors in the Department of Defense and Intelligence community that civilian students can make a meaningful contribution to problem understanding and rapid prototyping of solutions to real-world problems.
Team NeoLens – AI-powered troubleshooting for military mechanics.
If you can’t see the NeoLens video click here
If you can’t see the NeoLens presentation click here
Go-to-Market/Deployment Strategies
The initial goal of the teams is to ensure they understand the problem. The next step is to see if they can find mission/solution fit (the DoD equivalent of commercial product/market fit.) But most importantly, the class teaches the teams about the difficult and complex path of getting a solution in the hands of a warfighter/beneficiary. Who writes the requirement? What’s an OTA? What’s color of money? What’s a Program Manager? Who owns the current contract? …
Team Omnicomm – improving the quality, security and resiliency of communications for special operations units.
If you can’t see the Omnicomm video click here
If you can’t see the Omnicomm presentation click here
Mission-Driven in 70 Universities and Continuing to Expand in Scope and Reach
What started as a class is now a movement.
From its beginning with our Stanford class, Hacking for Defense is now offered in over 70 universities in the U.S., as well as in the UK as Hacking for the MOD and in Australia. In the U.S., the course is a program of record and supported by Congress, H4D is sponsored by the Common Mission Project, Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), and the Office of Naval Research (ONR). Corporate partners include Boeing, Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin.
Steve Weinstein started Hacking for Impact (Non-Profits) and Hacking for Local (Oakland) at U.C. Berkeley, and Hacking for Oceans at bot Scripps and UC Santa Cruz, as well as Hacking for Climate and Sustainability at Stanford. Jennifer Carolan started Hacking for Education at Stanford.
Team Strom – simplified mineral value chain.
If you can’t see the Strom video click here
If you can’t see the Strom presentation click here
What’s Next For These Teams?
.When they graduate, the Stanford students on these teams have the pick of jobs in startups, companies, and consulting firms .This year, seven of our teams applied to the Defense Innovation Unit accelerator – the DIU Defense Innovation Summer Fellows Program – Commercialization Pathway. Seven were accepted. This further reinforced our thinking that Hacking for Defense has turned into a pre-accelerator – preparing students to transition their learning from the classroom to deployment
See the teams present in person here
It Takes A Village
While I authored this blog post, this class is a team project. The secret sauce of the success of Hacking for Defense at Stanford is the extraordinary group of dedicated volunteers supporting our students in so many critical ways.
The teaching team consisted of myself and:
Our teaching assistants this year were Joel Johnson, Rachel Wu, Evan Twarog, Faith Zehfuss, and Ethan Hellman.
31 Sponsors, Business and National Security Mentors
The teams were assisted by the originators of their problems – the sponsors.
Thanks to all!