2026-02-13 03:25:56
Russia’s war in Ukraine is not being fought by a united “multiethnic people,” as Vladimir Putin likes to claim. The enormous burden of the fighting and the death toll has been disproportionately borne by the peoples of the poorest and most remote parts of the country.
New analysis by The Bell shows that the human cost of the invasion falls overwhelmingly on impoverished regions and minorities, and that this burden will only grow as the economy deteriorates.
Since the full-scale invasion in February 2022, the Kremlin has framed the war as a shared national trial. Early on, Putin cited the heroism of Nurmagomed Gadzhimagomedov, a Lak from Dagestan, and other soldiers to say: “I am a Lak, I am Dagestani, I’m Chechen, Ingush, Russian, Tatar, Jewish, Mordvin, Ossetian . . . part of the strong, multiethnic people of Russia.”
An analysis of casualty data collected by BBC Russia and Mediazona tells a different story. The likelihood of dying at the front varies between regions by significant orders of magnitude. The data of almost 170,000 war fatalities is based on public mentions of the deceased, but doesn’t cover all Russian losses.
The state’s decision to focus on the poor and the remote means the human costs of war are lowest in Russia’s wealthy conurbations. Muscovites are relatively the least likely to suffer death — Moscow has the lowest recorded fatality rate at about 0.02% of residents, or 1 in 5,000. St. Petersburg and Chechnya (the fiefdom of Putin’s local strongman Ramzan Kadyrov) follow at 0.03%. In Buryatia, the rate is 0.4% (1 in 250), and in Chukotka and Tuva it reaches 0.5%.
This means that the people of these last-mentioned, unfavored regions are around 25 times more likely to die in combat than Muscovites. Roughly 20 other regions have similarly inflated death tolls.
At first glance, this pattern does not simply track regional wealth, measured as gross regional product per capita. Poor Ingushetia and Karachay-Cherkessia, for example, have casualty levels closer to those of affluent Moscow and St. Petersburg than to those of equally poor Chukotka and Tuva. Neither does it reflect the rises in regional median salaries.
So what’s going on?
Some broad trends help explain the gap:
The strongest driver, however, is poverty. The Bell finds a clear correlation between regional death rates and the share of people living below the poverty line, around 19,000 rubles, or $250, a month. Some regions now offer sign-up bonuses totaling 2.5m rubles, around 132 times poverty-level income.
This poverty pattern reflects the Kremlin’s recruitment strategy. After the unpopular September 2022 mobilization of 300,000 men, the authorities pivoted to “voluntary” recruitment with high salaries and large one-off bonuses.
Polls suggest that a majority of Russians believe new soldiers are driven mainly by money. Casualty data support this: among voluntary recruits, the worst-hit group is men aged 45–50 — people more likely to be under financial strain. Many regions with high sign-up bonuses, like oil-rich Yugra, are ready to enlist volunteers from neighboring districts, and even reimburse travel expenses.
Regions have a Kremlin-defined quota of contracts to be signed, and some further distort the picture by “poaching” recruits from elsewhere with inflated sign-up payments.
When professional soldiers — who took heavy losses early in the war — are excluded, and the analysis is limited to about 60,000 contract recruits, the link between poverty and casualties becomes even clearer.
Russia’s war is being fought largely by poor people from distant, economically depressed regions, many of them with large ethnic minority populations. The Kremlin appears to be shielding politically sensitive centers such as Moscow, St. Petersburg, and parts of the North Caucasus, the home of an Islamist insurgency in the late 20th and early 21st century, while shifting the human cost to the periphery and using large payouts to do so.
But there are serious flaws in this approach.
Firstly, the sheer numbers. A CSIS report in January estimated Russia has lost up to 325,000 men dead and close to 900,000 wounded, the greatest losses recorded by any major power in any war since World War II. For a country already suffering an acute demographic decline and which has seen perhaps a million emigrate since the war began, this cannot be sustainable, at least in the medium-term.
Secondly, the economic effects are severe. Men fighting at the front cannot work in a domestic economy where growth is stalling and wages stagnating. That means more Russians are pushed into poverty, making military service for money ever more attractive.
This structure of losses is unlikely on its own to trigger systemic collapse. As long as the economy is weak and the war continues, financial incentives will keep drawing in volunteers.
Yet if low growth and high inflation persist, deepening poverty may still push many with few alternatives toward the front — ensuring that the poorest continue to die in disproportionate numbers.
How long Russia can continue to pay this terrible price is the great unknown.
Alexander Kolyandr is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), specializing in the Russian economy and politics. Previously, he was a journalist for the Wall Street Journal and a banker for Credit Suisse. He was born in Kharkiv, Ukraine, and lives in London.
More on this and other aspects of the Russian economy in a weekly summary produced by the independent publication, The Bell.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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2026-02-13 02:18:50
Battle lines are drawn. A year ago, US Vice President JD Vance came to Munich and delivered an unvarnished “America First” message. Since then, the allies have fought over everything from tariffs to territory, with tech policy thrown in for good measure.
European leaders started with accommodation. They struck a trade deal, accepting stiff American duties. But as Washington continued to demand more concessions, European attitudes are hardening. A strong “Europe First” flavor wafts over Munich.
The conference agenda is packed with events focused on technology and technology policy. Sovereignty and resilience pop up in panel titles. Speakers will address how Europe can manage on its own. European leaders are meeting this week in a Belgian castle to discuss a “Buy European” plan. They are signing trade deals with mid-sized powers. And they are determined to resist US pressure to dilute their strong tech regulations.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio will lead the US delegation to Munich. Vice Presidents are the traditional choice. Rubio arrives as European views of the US are hardening. The number of British people who view the US unfavorably has doubled in the past two years to 64%. In Germany, 71% now view the US as an “adversary,” and across Europe, just 16% view the US as an ally.
The tensions have spilled over into disputes over tech policy. European regulations remain toxic in Washington and in Silicon Valley, where they are perceived as punitive for American companies, too lax on China, and — in some quarters — a challenge to free speech. Washington attacks Europe’s Digital Services Act as “censorship” and the Digital Markets Act as targeting US tech platforms.
Europeans disagree and look unlikely to dilute their regulations to please Americans. European Commissioner Henna Virkkunen says the EU laws are democratically decided and aimed at protecting citizens from online risks such as terrorist content and child sexual abuse. She vows to continue issuing fines and warnings against US tech firms.
Europe is also moving fast to diversify trade — including with China. In recent weeks, the leaders of Britain, Ireland, and Finland have travelled to Beijing, with Germany’s chancellor expected to follow next month. The European Commission approved the largest-ever trade agreement with Mercosur and just penned another massive deal with India. The relationship between the United Kingdom and the EU has thawed from frosty to lukewarm. “Middle powers” are attempting to work together to form an alternative pillar in world affairs, as Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney suggested in Davos.
Practical limitations exist to such a strategy. Attempts to replace American, non-European tech, software, hardware, and services could cost between €3 and €5 trillion, without any guarantee of success. Europe cannot afford such a bill.
Another debate centers on whether to back a “Buy European” strategy designed to reduce dependency on US tech. French President Emmanuel Macron has been vocal in recent days about Europe’s need to stand up for itself and apply European preferences to certain strategic sectors. It’s a call for a return to France’s industrial policy roots, arguing that if the US can be transactional, well, so too can Europe.
“We must protect our industry,” Macron said. “The Chinese do it, and so do the Americans. Europe is currently the most open market in the world.”
But other European leaders disagree. The Netherlands, the Nordics, and the Baltics argue that the European preference would increase regulatory burdens and scare investors away. “The basic idea of trying to protect European business, if that is the purpose of Buy European, to try to avoid trading with or partnering with other countries, then I’m very skeptical,” Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson said before this week’s European leaders’ summit.
Support for transatlantic decoupling diminishes the further one travels east. Countries closest to Russia and to the ongoing war in Ukraine are focused on keeping the US in the “security” tent for as long as possible. Everyone acknowledges the need for a more resilient Europe, but the route has not been signed off on.
Europe acknowledges it has a competitiveness problem. It has drawn up plans to simplify rules and ramp up the internal market. These changes cannot happen soon enough. For all the conflict, the EU and the US are natural partners on tech, and both sides should continue to seek opportunities for cooperation to maintain independence from China.
US tech leadership would be bolstered by working with its European allies. There is no prospect of a ceremonial handshake resetting transatlantic relations on tech or anything else. If the planned conversations in Munich are a guide, Europe is preparing to eke out its future, not by cutting all ties across the Atlantic Ocean, but by reducing the risk of overreliance on them.
Ronan Murphy is Director of the Tech Policy Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis.
Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions expressed on Bandwidth are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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2026-02-13 00:57:10
After four years of full-scale war, the number of veterans transitioning back to civilian life is steadily growing. And, while public discourse emphasizes gratitude and respect for those who served, questions are being asked about the best way to reintegrate them and reduce the risks of marginalization, isolation, and long-term social exclusion.
The challenge is not unique to Ukraine. In the US and other post-conflict societies, veteran reintegration has long been understood as a core social policy issue rather than a narrow welfare concern. How Ukraine responds will not only shape the well-being of veterans, but also broader social cohesion, labor market stability, and trust in state institutions.
New data from Portrait of a Veteran 2025, a joint study conducted by Rating Group and the Ukrainian Veterans Fund under the Ministry for Veterans Affairs, provides a candid insight into veterans’ assessment of postwar life. Based on interviews with 240 veterans, the findings reveal not panic or resentment, but sober awareness of structural vulnerabilities.
The most frequently cited risks relate to psychological and social stability. Some 84% of respondents identified psycho-emotional instability as a likely challenge, while 79% pointed to alcohol or substance abuse. More than three-quarters fear a lack of understanding from society, and a similar proportion anticipate difficulties related to physical health and access to medical care.
Employment remains a central concern: 73% expect problems finding work, and 72% highlight the absence of inclusive spaces and adapted workplaces for people with disabilities. Family tensions are also prominent, with 71% expecting conflicts at home after demobilization.
Importantly, veterans link these personal struggles to broader society. 60% believe military experience is poor preparation for civilian life, while 58% cite bureaucratic obstacles in accessing social benefits.
More than half associate reintegration failures with increased risks of involvement in crime, and nearly half mention suicide as a possible outcome. These perceptions reflect a clear understanding among veterans that weak institutions and fragmented policies can turn individual vulnerabilities into systemic problems.
When asked to evaluate how well their needs are currently met, veterans describe a support system that functions unevenly. Easily administered benefits, such as discounted public transportation, receive relatively high marks, but core reintegration needs receive only moderate or low scores. Medical care and physical rehabilitation, for example, average 3.3 out of 5, and employment support 3.2, while psychological assistance scores just above 3.
Housing provision and legal support are rated lowest of all, underscoring persistent gaps in areas critical to long-term stability.
Half of veterans identify material support as their most urgent need, followed closely by medical assistance. Roughly a quarter cite psychological support and housing, while legal assistance remains a significant concern for one in five respondents.
Only one in 10 veterans say they currently require no support at all, and most report using at least some state-provided benefits, particularly utility subsidies, free transportation, medical services, and pensions.
While a slim majority consider government veteran programs effective, a large minority openly question their impact. By contrast, non-governmental organizations — civil society groups, charities, and volunteer networks — are viewed far more favorably.
Three-quarters of respondents consider NGO-led veteran programs effective, suggesting that flexibility, responsiveness, and proximity to veterans’ real needs often matter more than formal institutional design.
Employment is perhaps the most critical test of successful reintegration. Separate research conducted by the Ukrainian Veterans Fund, together with the employment platform robota.ua, shows more than 57% of veterans face barriers when seeking civilian jobs.
The most common obstacles include wages that fail to meet basic needs, physical health limitations, psychological strain, and direct discrimination. These same factors frequently contribute to job loss after initial employment, reinforcing cycles of instability rather than facilitating sustainable reintegration.
Veterans have clear ideas of what would help. The most frequently cited measures include retraining and reskilling programs, job quotas, formal recognition of military service as work experience, and integrated support packages combining education, psychological assistance, and job placements.
In other words, veterans want institutional mechanisms that translate their skills and experience into civilian economic participation, and experience in other countries offers useful reference points.
In the US, for example, programs such as the GI Bill, the Veterans Educational Assistance Program, and the Department of Labor’s Veterans’ Employment and Training Service treat reintegration as a long-term process rather than a one-time intervention. Education funding, modular job training, employer engagement, and legal protections against workplace discrimination are combined into a coherent system.
While Ukrainians recognize these programs are far from perfect, they reflect an understanding that veteran reintegration can succeed when education, employment, healthcare, and rights protection are addressed together rather than in isolation.
And elements of this approach are beginning to emerge in Ukraine. Some large employers, such as Kernel and DTEK, have started experimenting with comprehensive reintegration models that begin not at demobilization, but at mobilization.
These corporate initiatives preserve jobs during service, maintain medical coverage, provide health and rehabilitation packages, offer retraining opportunities, and adapt workplaces for employees with disabilities. While such programs cannot substitute for state policy, they highlight the benefits of early planning and institutional continuity.
The data points to a policy challenge that cuts across healthcare, employment, education, housing, and anti-discrimination frameworks. Ukraine’s response will shape not only the future of its veterans, but also public trust in institutions and the inclusiveness of the postwar social contract.
The question is not whether Ukraine can afford to invest in veterans’ reintegration, it is whether the country can afford the long-term social and political costs of failing to do so.
Kateryna Odarchenko is a political consultant, a partner of the SIC Group Ukraine, and president of the PolitA Institute for Democracy and Development. A specialist practicing in the field of political communication and projects, she has practical experience in the implementation of all-Ukrainian political campaigns and party-building projects.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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2026-02-13 00:07:19
The 40 days between December 2 and January 12 accounted for 10% of all Russian attacks on ports and ships that have been launched since the full-scale invasion in 2022. The onslaught demonstrates that the Kremlin remains determined to destroy Ukraine’s vital export infrastructure and sales. The attacks show no sign of letting up.
The Black Sea grain corridor remains operational but under sustained pressure, both from security threats and structural constraints.
Agricultural products are Ukraine’s most important export. In 2021, the last year before the full-scale invasion, they totaled $27.8bn, accounting for 41% of the country’s overall exports. In 2023, Ukraine exported agricultural products (including grains) worth $22bn, rising to $41.7bn for commodities in 2024, a category dominated by agri-food.
Russia has used missiles, drones, and naval mines to attack Ukrainian ports and commercial shipping. Rather than imposing a formal blockade, like the failed version it attempted from February to July 2022, it has pursued a strategy of persistent disruption, forcing Kyiv to devote scarce resources to coastal air defense and port protection.
Lacking a conventional navy capable of matching Russia, Ukraine has focused on asymmetric means to attack Russian naval vessels and installations. Uncrewed surface vessels, underwater drones, and long-range precision strikes have hit a wide range of targets (see here and here).
These operations have forced Russia to disperse forces, reinforce port defenses, and reconsider basing patterns. Beyond their material impact, Ukrainian maritime strikes carry strategic and psychological weight, challenging assumptions about Russian naval dominance.
After Russia’s unilateral withdrawal from the UN‑brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023, Kyiv established its own maritime export corridor through ports such as Odesa, Chornomorsk, and Pivdennyi.
This has allowed the continued shipment of agricultural exports, but the risks are high, and it remains strategically vulnerable. At the height of the 2022 blockade, Ukraine also utilized its ports on the Danube to organize a river route as an alternative, although the capacity for goods transit was much lower due to the smaller size of the river vessels. The Danube route remains operational, and Russia attacks ports there, but it remains secondary to the main maritime route.
In April 2024, Ukraine exported approximately 6.6m tons of grain and oilseeds, the highest monthly figure since the start of Russia’s full‑scale invasion, with about 5.2m tons shipped via its Black Sea ports.
Yet volumes have been volatile: in April 2025, for instance, exports via the corridor reportedly declined by around 45% year‑on‑year, illustrating its sensitivity to security and market conditions.
Despite such fluctuations, it has been a story of remarkable success in the face of tremendous adversity.
Yet the latest Russian onslaught adds ever more pressure on Kyiv’s resources.
Missile and drone strikes on port infrastructure and the threat to commercial vessels directly affect the security of exports and push up insurance costs, testing the willingness of shipping companies to operate in the region. So far, operators have not been withdrawing from transporting goods, but the risks are real. The underwriting and insurance of the Black Sea grain trade has transitioned to a mixture of private, specialized insurance markets and a state-supported Ukrainian facility, which includes such giants as Lloyd’s of London.
The grain corridor’s continued functioning reflects Ukraine’s adaptability, yet its sustainability is dependent on a viable level of security, the cost tolerance of global shipping markets, and Ukraine’s agricultural output.
The corridor is a critical economic and geopolitical asset whose disruption would have immediate consequences for Ukraine and global food security.
Ukraine’s role as a major breadbasket means disruptions to its grain trade —specifically wheat, corn, and sunflower oil — have severe impacts on global food security, causing price surges and supply shortages, particularly in Africa and the Middle East.
The Black Sea has entered a phase of protracted contestation, in which ongoing military activity coexists with emerging informal constraints for civilian shipping and third-party actors.
This is likely to continue even after the fighting stops. How this is managed — especially with regard to civilian shipping and third-party interests — will be critical in determining whether the region moves toward a fragile equilibrium or even greater instability.
Dr. Volodymyr Dubovyk is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at CEPA. He has been working at the Odesa I. Mechnikov National University since 1992, as an Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations since 1996, and has acted as a Director of the Center for International Studies since 1999.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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2026-02-12 03:09:10
J.D. Vance toured Armenia and Azerbaijan on February 9-11, the first such high-level US visit to Armenia. The trip underlined two things: America’s indifference to Russia’s claimed areas of influence, and Kremlin weakness.
Vance’s visit underlines that while the Trump administration seeks better relations with Russia, the United States is undaunted about entry to an area the Kremlin likes to call its “near abroad”.
The vice president’s visit brought a frustrated response from the Russian state-controlled newspaper Kommersant. “There’s disappointment, frustration and a sense of helplessness,” the author wrote of Vance’s arrival in the South Caucasus. “Because it’s precisely in this region that Russia’s position has eroded noticeably in recent years. The main reason is obvious: excessive absorption in the Ukrainian conflict ties the hands in all other areas.”
US ambitions should not be overstated. It does not plan a military presence in the region. The aims are more economic than geopolitical, although as Russia well knows the one can lead to the other.
And the US aims to expand into traditional Russian areas. It is making inroads in spheres like peaceful nuclear cooperation. First and foremost, Armenia and the US signed the so-called 123 Agreement on nuclear cooperation, which would either replace the Soviet-era Metsamor nuclear plant or build modular reactors in addition to Metsamor, a technology in which the US is a global leader. Washington opened the way to a whopping $9bn investment in that area.
The Armenian government’s decision is a setback for Rosatom. The nuclear sphere has been a core component of Russia’s projection of power in the former Soviet space. The state company, Rosatom, has signed multiple deals with central Asian, Middle Eastern, and African countries. It has been a company with global reach and is pitching hard for the Armenia contract.
Yerevan may yet strike a balance between Moscow and Washington. Armenia is expected to sign a separate agreement with the Russian company for at least some part of its nuclear infrastructure, as discussed at an early February meeting between Russian and Armenian officials.
In another agreement with Washington, Armenia also pledged to buy $11m worth of US-made V-BAT type drones, and both sides agreed to expand their cooperation in AI and semiconductor innovation. The US vice-president said that Armenia will be able to acquire NVIDIA graphics processing units.
Next stop, Azerbaijan, where Vance signed the Charter on Strategic Partnership between the two countries. The bilateral talks revolved around oil and gas partnerships, electricity supplies via the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a US-leased road corridor aiming ultimately to link Turkey to the Caspian Sea. This follows intensive discussions between Baku and Washington on military issues, security, and trade.
The US is mindful that Armenia and Azerbaijan form a contiguous flank to Iran’s northern border. In a period of intense tensions between the United States and the Islamic Republic, Armenia and Azerbaijan’s alignment with Washington could serve as an additional pressure point on Tehran — Osint analysts counted more than 20 large US military transport aircraft flying into the two countries in the days up to February 9.
TRIPP is another challenge to Iran. It wants to keep the Aras corridor operational — this existing route skirts Armenia from the south and allows Azerbaijan proper to link up with its Nakhchivan exclave. Should TRIPP proceed as proposed, Iran will lose transit revenues but, more importantly, a powerful geopolitical tool when it comes to the relations with Azerbaijan, since it can interrupt transit should it choose. Vance’s visit is an additional sign that Washington is serious about the project, though there was less discussion on TRIPP than many expected.
It focused more on pushing Armenia and Azerbaijan closer to finally signing a comprehensive peace agreement, a logical step following the summit held in Washington in August. Here, too, the US side has evolved into a key participant in the peace process, sidelining Russia. Washington has emerged as a favored player given that both Armenia and Azerbaijan have serious grievances about Kremlin policy, and efforts at normalization are flagging.
Russia is struggling to find a response. Prior to Donald Trump’s second term, US engagement with the South Caucasus was more focused on democracy promotion, human rights, and, to a certain extent geopolitical importance of the region. Russia responded, seeking to thwart America’s initiatives via military moves, as with its 2008 invasion of Georgia.
Under Trump II, a more subtle approach is shaping up. This is largely based on transactional activities. With that come US investments into vital areas, and concomitant direct political dialogue.
Of course, to have a comprehensive South Caucasus strategy, the US will need to have Georgia on board too after a freeze in relations following the outcome of its 2024 election that the Biden administration heavily criticized. It’s notable that Vance talked to Georgian officials during the Winter Olympics opening ceremony in Milan; the ruling party claimed the brief discussions had been positive.
The central theme at the moment is clear, however. The US is on the way up in the South Caucasus, and Russia is struggling to find a response.
Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of the Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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2026-02-12 02:06:32
AI “Godfather” Geoffrey Hinton warns that his invention will create massive unemployment and send profits soaring — “that is the capitalist system.” Within five years, Dario Amodei, CEO of AI company Anthropic, predicts that half of “administrative, managerial and tech jobs for people under 30” could vanish.
Yet throughout history, automation has not translated into a permanent rise in unemployment or into a lasting shift of income from labor to capital. Producers capture only a small share of the total returns from technological change. Disruption raises, not lowers, overall living standards.
Look at several Western European countries over the period of 1870-1998. Massive industrialization generated an 18-fold gain in productivity per hour worked. Incomes soared. The work week is shortened, increasing leisure. Employment stayed steady. Higher productivity raised real incomes and demand, absorbing labor into new tasks and sectors even as old ones vanished.
Nor did the rich owners profit at the expense of workers. During the Industrial Revolution from 1770 to 1860, British economist Nicholas Crafts found that the labor share of income versus the capital share remained almost unchanged, rising from 61% to 62%. During the second half of the 20th century, Nobel Prize-winning economist William Nordhaus concluded that producers captured “only a minuscule fraction of the social returns from technological innovation.”
Some may argue that this time may be different — that AI really is going to take all the jobs. But a decade ago, Geoffrey Hinton predicted the demise of radiologists, arguing that “deep learning is going to do better than radiologists.” Today, demand for radiologists is rising, not falling. Hospitals report shortages. A radiologist’s job consists of many tasks. AI may complement or potentially automate some, driving the value of, and demand for, radiology up.
Another concern is the weak job prospects for new college graduates. A much-quoted paper, “Canaries in the Coal Mine?”, blamed AI. But other research disagreed, saying a tight labor market was not confined to graduates. Little evidence existed to support “large-scale AI-driven displacement of early-career knowledge-sector jobs,” says John Burn-Murdoch, a data economist.
No smoking gun exists. Even if we accept that entry-level jobs could come under pressure from AI, demand for “AI natives” is bound to rise. Tech giant Shopify, for example, is “hiring more interns because they’re the ones who are using AI in the most interesting ways.”
AI has emerged against the backdrop of declining economic dynamism. Despite the digital revolution, productivity growth and the creation and destruction of firms and jobs have declined in advanced Western economies over the past two decades.
AI may help return us to past rates of progress (and disruption) rather than usher in an unusually disruptive era. A bottleneck bind will require human oversight. These “bottlenecks” include tasks subject to occupational licensing, which stipulate human credentials to perform certain tasks, such as prescribing a medicine. Although some requirements should and will be modified to permit AI alternatives, occupational licensing applies to a wide range of tasks, and efforts at reform will meet resistance.
Deeper reasons than licensing also suggest that AI might not substitute for all desk-based work. First, human preferences ultimately matter, and we will continue to hold humans accountable when things go wrong.
Second, work often involves bargaining, and its counterparts’ withholding information and deception. If we insist that AI not deceive humans, it would not be able to successfully bargain on our behalf. During a recent Cheeky Pint podcast, Elon Musk argued that AI should be “truth-seeking” and not say things it doesn’t believe.
Third, to pursue socially beneficial goals, particularly when exploring new ways of doing things, people may bend or break the rules. Sometimes we turn a blind eye, sometimes we change the rules, and sometimes we punish transgression. AI is unlikely to be afforded such discretion.
Humans can productively deceive others, bend or break the rules when the payoff from doing so is large (and not simply zero-sum), and can be punished if they err. It is a delicate dance. Progress depends on it, and it seems most unlikely we will permit AI to perform such tasks. To err is human.
I expect economically productive work for humans to persist. What we need now is more innovation and growth — not less — and AI offers that prospect. We should embrace the new technology and accept that it will both create jobs and destroy them.
Brian Williamson is a partner at the London-based Communications Chambers consultancy. He works at the intersection of technology, economics, and policy. Clients have included governments, regulators, telcos, and tech companies. This article is adapted from a just-published paper, AI, Copyright and the Public Good.
Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions expressed on Bandwidth are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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