2026-04-16 03:20:36
Amid widespread suffering and more than 180,000 documented war crimes committed by Russia during its war on Ukraine, the heightened risk of sex trafficking of Ukrainians has been largely absent from US and European policy discussions.
Millions of forcibly displaced people, in particular women and children, have become increasingly vulnerable to transnational criminals exploiting instability, weak oversight, and humanitarian corridors since the full-scale invasion.
While criminal networks exploited Ukrainians for trafficking before 2022 — more than 300,000 mostly women may have been affected between 1991 and 2021 according to the International Organization for Migration — the full-scale invasion has exacerbated such crimes.
By 2025, the war had forced 6.9 million people — mostly women and children — to flee Ukraine, displaced an additional 3.6 million within its borders, and driven more than half the country’s children from their homes, making Ukrainians increasingly vulnerable to traffickers. As of February 2026, the latest United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees data shows that there are currently 5.9 million Ukrainians externally displaced, with the majority are located in Europe.
Yet the link between sex trafficking and Russia’s war isn’t often made in public discourse, and research has been limited. Cases are likely to be underreported and reliable data on Ukrainians being trafficked within Russia and Russian-occupied territories is scarce.
Alongside russification, forced indoctrination, and militarization, the thousands of Ukrainian children abducted by Moscow are vulnerable to Russian criminals forcing them into prostitution. Moscow claims it is saving Ukrainian children from such crimes, but Russia’s longstanding history of trafficking and credible reports of abuse suggest otherwise.
“Crisis and emergency situations put children at greater risk of being separated from their parents and protective environment, and of being displaced without control or supervision by the authorities,” Benoît van Keirsbilck, an independent expert advising the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, warned in 2024. “These children are easy prey for child traffickers, illegal adopters, and exploitation, including sexual exploitation.”
And Russian sex trafficking networks have a long history.
Canadian journalist Viktor Malarek wrote in The Natashas: Inside the New Global Sex Trade in 2003 that the main orchestrator of the trafficking of Eastern European women, including Ukrainians, was Russian organized crime, and the pattern has continued.
Malarek described beatings, mass rape, and the killing of voiceless women in a chilling account which foreshadowed the widespread sexual brutality and inhumanity of Russian soldiers in Ukraine’s occupied territories after 2022.
Russia has forcibly transferred as many as 1.6 million Ukrainians to Russia, Belarus, and the occupied territories, and, given the role of Russian organized crime in sex trafficking, Ukrainians forced into Russian-controlled territories face a significantly higher risk of exploitation.
“Traffickers target Internally Displaced Persons and subject some Ukrainians to forced labor, forced conscription, and sexual exploitation in Russia-controlled areas, including via kidnapping, torture, and extortion,” the US State Department said in a trafficking report published in September.
And the number of recorded cases is likely to be the tip of the iceberg, such as language barriers, fear of authorities, unawareness of where to seek help, and limited research contribute to underreporting.
Criminal gangs “exploit Ukrainian victims in sex trafficking and forced labor in Ukraine, Russia, Poland, Germany, other parts of Europe, China, Kazakhstan, and the Middle East,” the State Department said. It also noted that “traffickers increasingly exploit Ukrainian victims in EU member states.”
Human trafficking is an international crime and should matter to the US, UK, EU, and the rest of the civilized world, as a fundamental question of human dignity. Whatever Americans’ and Europeans’ views on Russia’s war on Ukraine, it is clear that the increased sexual exploitation of Ukrainians is a direct consequence of the instability created by Moscow’s aggression.
Addressing it requires a more coordinated policy response from Washington, London, and Brussels.
First, policymakers should prioritize the investigation and disruption of transnational trafficking networks exploiting Ukrainians. This includes strengthening intelligence-sharing and law enforcement cooperation among Western partners and targeting financial flows, including cryptocurrency transactions, that sustain criminal operations.
Second, there is a clear need for more systematic research and data collection. Policymakers need a better understanding of trafficking routes, network hubs — including those operating in Western countries — and the security and economic implications for local communities, such as the inflow of dirty money.
Third, increased funding should be directed to victim protection, prevention, and rehabilitation. This includes expanding support for NGOs, safe houses, and services for displaced populations, particularly women and children.
Fourth, international criminal actors should be publicly identified and, once apprehended, face severe legal consequences.
Finally, trafficking must be more integrated into policy discussions on Russia’s war. Recognizing the link between the war and sex trafficking brings the issue into sharper focus and highlights the wider consequences of the war, not only for Ukraine but for international security and democratic resilience.
Ilya Timtchenko is a Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at CEPA.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
Either Europe will continue allowing Russia’s shadow war to set the terms of escalation, or it will act now to prevent a larger war.
Explore CEPA’s flagship event.
The post A Hidden Plague: Russia’s Sex Trafficking of Ukrainians appeared first on CEPA.
2026-04-16 00:44:38
Péter Magyar has spoken at length twice since his overwhelming electoral triumph that ended 16 years of rule by the illiberal strongman Viktor Orbán.
The first was a long nighttime speech on a podium surrounded by cheering crowds of supporters with the Danube behind him and Hungary’s great neo-Gothic parliament beyond, which lasted more than an hour. The second was a press conference lasting more than three hours on April 14. A short section is also included from a state TV interview on the same day. Below is a selection of his words. Quotes do not follow on from one another.
My fellow countrymen, Hungarians, we did it. Tisza and Hungary have won this election. Not just by a little, but by a lot — in fact, by a great deal.
Together, we have ousted the Orbán regime and liberated Hungary; we have reclaimed our homeland.
Our victory is visible even from the moon [and] certainly from Brussels [and] from every Hungarian window. Whether it’s the smallest mud-brick house or a high-rise apartment building, in the city or the countryside, it’s visible from every window.
We won today because the Hungarian people did not ask what their country could do for them, but rather asked what they could do for their country. And you did not just ask; you also found the answer and took the action demanded by the homeland.
How many times and how many people told us that it wasn’t worth going to the countryside, that we couldn’t leave the capital? How many times did we hear that we had to come to terms with being ‘His Majesty’s opposition’, that we had to make deals, because there was no other way? But of course there is — today you have proven that it is indeed possible
Magyar linked his April 12 victory to other notable dates in Hungarian history, including the anti-Habsburg revolution of 1848 and the anti-Russian uprising of 1956, calling them moments of grace.
Let this too be a date inscribed in gold in the history of Hungarian freedom — not the victory of one party over another, but the victory of Hungarians over those who betrayed them, the victory of freedom over those who betrayed them. Let this be a victory for all Hungarians today, for those who voted for Tisza and for those who did not.”
The task is enormous, but we Hungarians love big challenges.
He made a number of demands aimed at the former government of Viktor Orbán and his supporters within the state machinery.
I call on the prime minister to act as a caretaker government starting today, and not to take any measures that would tie the hands of the next government.
He told Orbán: If any questions arise during the transition period, please contact me; you have my phone number.
I also call on the President of the Republic to ask me to form a government, then step down from office, and I call on all the puppets to do the same.
He then demanded the resignations of the following:
The President of the Curia (Supreme Court),
the President of the Constitutional Court,
the Prosecutor General,
the President of the State Audit Office,
the President of the Competition Authority,
the President of the Media Authority, and
the President of the National Office for the Judiciary
Accountability:
From now on, we will no longer be a country without consequences . . . those who have robbed the country will be held accountable [as will those who] incited hatred between Hungarians.
To Fidesz supporters and his own Tisza voters:
Dear fellow Hungarians who support Fidesz. I know you are disappointed today. I know it is difficult to process defeat, especially a major and deserved defeat. I know you are angry with us — and with me personally — because being in opposition is hard. But here and now, I, Péter Magyar, promise you that I will also be your prime minister, and I will work to heal wounds and help us accept each other, even if we represent different views.
Dear 3.3 million Tisza voters, I ask you to begin reconciliation — not with the guilty, but by extending a hand to every Hungarian. From today, there are no better or worse Hungarians, only Hungarians. From today, this country lives again.
Never before in the history of democratic Hungary have so many people voted, and never before has any party received such a strong mandate as Tisza. You have given us the authority to build a functioning and humane homeland for all of us, for every Hungarian.
State TV interview on April 14. Magyar pledged to suspend state TV and radio until its public service ethos was restored:
This factory of lies will end once a Tisza government is formed. The fake news broadcast here must stop, and we will create independent, objective, and impartial conditions to end this propaganda.
He went on to accuse the broadcaster of spreading false information about him and insulting his family during the campaign.
Presenter: I would like to reject, on behalf of all my colleagues, the claims that we insulted your family.
Magyar: In this studio, it has been said several times that my young children do not speak to me, while in fact, they live with me.
Foreign Affairs:
My first trip will take me to Poland to strengthen the 1,000-year-old Polish-Hungarian friendship. My second trip will take me to Vienna. And my third will be to Brussels to secure the EU funds to which Hungarians are entitled.
Magyar insisted that Hungary will remain committed to both NATO and the EU, describing them as key guarantees of peace, and reiterated that he would end Hungary’s reliance on Russian oil and gas by 2035.
We will have discussions with the European Union, but we are not going there to fight.
On Ukraine, Magyar said he would meet President Volodymyr Zelenskyy:
Everyone knows Ukraine is the victim in the war . . . I will ask Vladimir Putin to end the killing.
But he added he won’t support fast-track EU membership for Kyiv:
It is completely out of the question for the European Union to admit a country at war.
Magyar called the US “a very important partner” and said that he would seek “good relations” with Trump.
If Vladimir Putin calls, I’ll pick up the phone. It would probably be a short phone conversation, and I don’t think he would end the war on my advice. Russia remains a security risk.
Our country has no time to waste. Hungary is in trouble in every respect. It has been plundered, looted, betrayed, indebted, and ruined.
On Israel:
Israel and Hungary share a “special relationship”.
“Hungary is home to a strong Jewish community — one of the largest in Europe — fortunately living in peace and security. Many Hungarian nationals live in Israel, and many Israeli citizens come here.
He denounced antisemitism and said his government would adopt a zero-tolerance policy. However, he said Hungary will not automatically block EU efforts to punish Israel, as his predecessor had done. Each case and decision must be assessed individually . . . We will see what decisions the Union makes and determine what serves both our interests and justice.
On the International Criminal Court (ICC):
We will re-initiate Hungary’s accession to cooperation with the International Criminal Court . . . I believe it is in the interest of the entire international community and of Hungary that we remain there, just as we have been until now.
Magyar received a note during the April 13 press conference, which he immediately shared with reporters, saying it came from sources within the Foreign Ministry.
I just received the information, I’ll share this with you. Many people thought that Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó had disappeared, since he couldn’t be seen yesterday during Viktor Orbán’s victory speech. Today at 10 am, he appeared at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and since then, he and his most direct colleagues have been shredding documents related to sanctions.
This is what is happening in Hungary right now. We have known for days that the destruction of documents has begun, not only in the ministries, but also in other institutions linked to the Orbán elites.
[Orban] had a great opportunity to do huge things in the national interest to ensure that Hungary became a developing European country . . . He did not use this chance, but abused it.
Sources:
Nicole Monette is a CEPA Editorial Intern and a graduate of New York University with master’s degrees in Journalism and European & Mediterranean Studies.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
Either Europe will continue allowing Russia’s shadow war to set the terms of escalation, or it will act now to prevent a larger war.
Explore CEPA’s flagship event.
The post Hungary’s Magyar in His Own Words appeared first on CEPA.
2026-04-16 00:21:31
Make no mistake, the Kremlin is feeling the pain from the historic landslide victory for Hungary’s opposition, ending the 16-year rule of Viktor Orbán.
The most immediate blow is ideological. Orbán was living proof that sovereign, illiberal democracy is possible, popular, and even sustainable in some parts of the European Union (EU). His fall damages that narrative and sets an uncomfortable precedent for Moscow’s other “illiberal” supporters — those already in power, like Slovakia; those with partial influence, as in the Czech Republic; and those with aspirations, as in Germany.
Each movement is linked by its adherence to nationalism and opposition to the EU, both of which play into Russia’s claims that the bloc is overweening and resisted by ordinary people. Each movement is either overtly Kremlin-friendly or, at a minimum, understanding of Russian ambitions.
Most European right-wing nationalist parties are skeptical about continued support for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia. Here, again, Orbán was a pioneer. Since 2022, Hungary has constantly complicated the extension of sanctions on Russia and the allocation of military aid to Kyiv via the European Peace Facility (EPF). It has also been blocking Ukraine’s EU accession process
Orbán was increasingly bold in thwarting Western support for Ukraine. In 2024, he blocked changes to sanctions that were necessary to loan Ukraine $50bn, bluntly declaring he would not budge until after the US election later that year, where he was betting on Donald Trump returning to power.
Last month, just three weeks before the Hungarian election, Orbán again prevented the allocation of more than $100bn in aid to Ukraine, this time linking it to the suspension of oil transit through the Druzhba pipeline.
In reality, Orbán has never been a principled pacifist, nor a deep ideological ally of Russia. In fact, he owes the start of his political career to an anti-Russian and anti-Soviet position, unlike say, his fellow illiberal Robert Fico in Slovakia, who was a communist. But when voting on sanctions and aid to Ukraine, Orbán has consistently acted as a pragmatic veto-wielder, extracting benefits for Hungary at every opportunity — cash from Brussels, exemptions on energy sanctions, transit compensation.
For Russia, this has been a boon. Orbán’s position slowed sanctions and aid to Ukraine. Russia didn’t have an overt ally, so much as a regular brake on the EU’s anti-Moscow initiatives. Orbán’s ultimate willingness to strike compromises for money meant Moscow could never rely on him fully to block the most hard-hitting measures, but it cost the EU time, money, and political effort.
Now, Moscow will lose that brake. Its public response to Orbán’s overwhelming defeat is therefore hard to swallow. The Kremlin’s mouthpiece, Dmitry Peskov, may have said on April 14 that, “We were never friends with Orbán”, but this is clearly untrue.
His replacement has already indicated he will rebuild relations with Brussels, not least to access almost €30bn ($35bn) in grants and funding that the EU froze in response to Orbán’s refusal to implement reforms and reverse his dismantling of Hungary’s democratic institutions.
He won’t hinder EU policy on Ukraine and Russia in the way Orbán has. We should not expect a complete U-turn on Ukraine, given divisions in the Hungarian electorate and the continued energy dependency on Russia, but Hungary’s permanent veto will come to an end.
What else does Russia lose? From an economic point of view, Budapest’s importance is as an energy and financial bridge to Europe. Orbán has consistently asserted Hungary’s right to continue buying Russian energy even after EU halts imports at the end of next year. Hungary is taking legal action to oppose this, and Magyar may continue that action. Ties with Moscow are too close for him to cut completely, but Budapest will now be less reliable and more suspicious of the Kremlin.
Hungary is a major buyer of Russian gas. In the six months before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Gazprom and Hungary’s MVM signed two contracts to deliver 4.5 billion cubic meters of gas per year until the end of 2036. Subsequent amendments boosted the volume to 7.7 billion cubic meters. At those volumes, the contract is worth around $2.5bn annually. Financially, it is not crucial to Russia. But to Gazprom, which lost almost all its European clients after the invasion, it is important. Moreover, unlike with oil, Russia has always used gas as more of a political lever than a revenue source.
Magyar would not be able to do much about these contracts. The standard terms of long-term Gazprom deals are “take or pay”: the buyer pays in full, even if it doesn’t receive the gas. Any negotiations to change the terms or leave early will bring Hungary years of arbitration and billions in fines.
That would harm Budapest far more than any lost profits would upset Moscow. The most Magyar could do would be to withdraw from the extra agreements, costing Russia more than $1bn a year. However, since Russian gas is cheaper than alternative LNG, he would struggle to explain increased energy bills to voters who had just supported him at the ballot box during a time of economic unrest. For all these reasons, the gas contracts will most likely remain largely untouched.
Hungary also buys, or, rather, has been buying, more Russian oil than anyone else in Europe. The EU in 2022 banned the purchase, import, or transit of Russian crude oil, but made exceptions for Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic because of their dependence on Russian fuel. Hungary gets about 10 million tons of oil a year through the Druzhba pipeline. Including Slovakia, where Hungary’s MOL owns the local Slovnaft oil company, deliveries on the southern branch of the pipeline amount to about 12 million tons a year.
However, Druzhba has been out of action since January due to what Ukraine says is damage from a Russian strike. Orbán blamed Ukraine for the blast, accused Ukraine of stalling repairs, and thus blocked the EU loan to Kyiv.
Magyar will likely soften Hungary’s stance, making the 2027 deadline more realistic. In theory, Russia would lose about $6bn a year in sales via Druzhba.
Russia would also likely shelve its plan to increase its footprint on the EU energy market through a sale of the controlling stake in Serbia’s oil company NIS from Russia’s Gazprom Neft to a consortium led by Hungary’s MOL. For the new government of Hungary, ditching the deal would be an easy way to demonstrate its pro-EU stance without hurting the population with high energy prices.
The third energy hook is Hungary’s Paks-2 nuclear station, currently under construction. The multi-billion-euro project involves Russia’s Rosatom nuclear agency (which is not EU-sanctioned). No government can halt it without colossal financial losses. Construction officially started in February, with commissioning expected around 2033-2035. The total cost is projected at €12.5bn, of which €10bn billion was loaned by Russia, a typical financing agreement for such projects. Abandoning would entail repaying that loan, plus financial penalties.
Continuing to work with Rosatom and deepening Hungary’s energy dependence on Russia is a toxic stance for a pro-European party. But Magyar will find it hard to step away without an alternative, especially as it is anticipated that the new station will provide 70% of Hungary’s electricity needs. That’s only underlined by the Iran war, which has again demonstrated that reliance on foreign fossil fuels is less than ideal.
The loss of Hungary as a financial channel to Europe is likely to be painful for Moscow. Some transactions between Russia and entities in the EU have been carried out via Hungarian structures precisely because Orbán’s government turned a blind eye. Under Magyar, this route might be closed.
Hungary’s OTP Bank plays a key role here. OTP’s Russian subsidiary is the 20th biggest bank in Russia by assets and one of the few that doesn’t face direct US sanctions. Other Russian subsidiaries of European banks, such as Austria’s Raiffeisenbank (the 11th largest in Russia) and Italy’s UniCredit (23rd), are also untouched by sanctions but face constant pressure from the European Central Bank to reduce their exposure to Russia, limit new lending, and expedite their exit from the market. (UniCredit is now considering liquidating its subsidiary.)
OTP is in a fundamentally different situation. Since Hungary is not in the Eurozone, it’s regulated by Hungary’s National Bank, not the ECB. European regulation has no direct leverage over OTP and, under Orbán, Hungary’s Central Bank had no concerns about its activities in Russia. This made OTP a unique channel for cross-border operations.
A new leader in Hungary could change all this. Officially, Hungary’s Central Bank is independent of the government, but a more Brussels-friendly administration in Budapest would be unlikely to protect OTP’s Russian activities from EU pressure. This could also pose a threat to Hungarian companies still working in Russia, which are suspected of being involved in schemes to circumvent technological and financial sanctions. The loss of this channel would complicate supply chains and increase costs, although it is impossible to calculate the extent of the real losses for Moscow.
Orbán’s defeat is painful for Russia. This is partly due to the impact on energy ties, like possible reductions in gas sales or problems building the nuclear power station. The loss of financial links via OTP would also sting.
But the real damage is strategic. Hungary is Russia’s major stronghold in the EU, simultaneously providing a veto at the EU Council, a banking channel, and energy contracts. None of this would collapse overnight, but Orbán’s departure could trigger an irreversible weakening in Moscow’s foothold inside the EU.
Alexander Kolyandr is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), specializing in the Russian economy and politics. Previously, he was a journalist for the Wall Street Journal and a banker for Credit Suisse. He was born in Kharkiv, Ukraine, and lives in London.
More on this and other aspects of the Russian economy in a weekly summary produced by the independent publication, The Bell.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
Either Europe will continue allowing Russia’s shadow war to set the terms of escalation, or it will act now to prevent a larger war.
Explore CEPA’s flagship event.
The post Russia and the Pain of Losing Hungary appeared first on CEPA.
2026-04-15 05:06:17
She stood in the doorway with one small bag, trying to make a choice. Her neighbors had already fled, and the shelling was getting closer. Yet she just couldn’t make herself leave. Not without her dog.
Scenes like this have played out across Ukraine since the full-scale invasion. People fleeing artillery and drones have carried dogs across their shoulders, tucked rabbits into backpacks, and watched children clutch turtles as they crossed borders.
Many delayed escape, or refused it entirely, because they couldn’t abandon animals that were part of their family.
At first glance, these decisions can seem irrational. In fact, they reveal something essential about how civilians endure prolonged terror, and what it takes to sustain a society under constant threat.
Russia’s war is an assault on the psychological foundations of civilian life as well as a military campaign, and understanding how Ukrainians maintain emotional resilience is central to their capacity to endure and ultimately prevail.
“When people are facing the fear of death, they can’t live every moment thinking about their own death, or the death of their children, so they shut down their emotions,” Dr. Richard Mollica, from Harvard Medical School’s Program in Refugee Trauma, said in an interview.
He has experienced the phenomenon repeatedly in war zones and in communities affected by disasters. The psycho-historian Robert Jay Lifton termed it “psychic numbing.”
It allows individuals to function in environments of constant danger, but it comes at a cost. As emotional responsiveness diminishes, so does the ability to feel attachment, empathy, and even the value of one’s own life.
And it’s an erosion that matters at a national level. A society that loses its capacity to feel is a society that becomes more vulnerable to despair, fragmentation, and manipulation.
This is where animals enter the story, not as a sentimental detail, but as a stabilizing force.
“You wake up in the morning with fear of death and annihilation,” Mollica said. “And then your dog jumps on you, gives you love, and, for that moment, you’re living in the present. You can feel again.”
Animals interrupt psychic numbing by restoring emotional connection in a way that is immediate, physical, and reliable, he said. In doing so, they help “dignity restoration” — the phrase he uses to describe the reawakening of a person’s sense of worth and humanity.
Across Ukraine, this process is happening quietly: a cat curled against a chest in a cold apartment, a dog waiting at the door of a damaged home, a horse nuzzling a hand in a farmyard within range of artillery.
They are part of the way civilians remain psychologically intact under prolonged stress. (Pets are also key for many soldiers — in a much-publicized event this month, Ukrainian forces used a drone to rescue a dog and a cat from the frontline and flew them 12km (7 miles) to safety.)
Ukraine’s system of emotional resilience depends on rarely recognized infrastructure: veterinarians, animal shelters, and their supply chains.
Veterinarians treat animals pulled from rubble, care for wounded military dogs, respond to mass abandonment, and, when necessary, perform euthanasia under extreme conditions.
Even in peacetime, veterinarians in the US and elsewhere have among the highest suicide rates for health professionals, and in Ukraine, the pressures are magnified by war, moral distress, exhaustion, and continuous exposure to suffering.
“They’re overwhelmed,” Mollica said. “They need support.”
When veterinary systems falter, the effects cascade. Animals suffer or die from treatable conditions, and the bonds that sustain civilians weaken. The emotional scaffolding that helps people endure begins to erode.
And this vulnerability is not lost on Russia.
Liberated areas report deliberate cruelty toward animals by the occupiers, including the destruction of shelters, killing of livestock and pets, and the targeting of facilities for animal care. Such actions are about humiliation and psychological degradation rather than battlefield necessity.
Ukraine’s resilience depends not only on weapons and logistics, but also on the psychological endurance of its people, and protecting those bonds is a strategic imperative.
First, veterinary services should be recognized as civil resilience infrastructure. This includes ensuring access to mobile veterinary units, emergency supply chains, and medications in frontline and recently liberated areas.
Second, support for veterinarians should be integrated into mental health initiatives. Targeted programs, from peer support to trauma-informed care, can help sustain a workforce that has a vital role in civilian well-being.
Third, the protection and restoration of animal shelters and facilities should be included in reconstruction planning, alongside schools, clinics, and housing.
Finally, international donors and partners should consider animal care as a key part of a broader strategy to support societal stability during prolonged conflict.
Ukraine has demonstrated extraordinary adaptability and innovation under pressure, and its ability to sustain that performance will depend on the resilience of its people, as well as its military capacity.
In that context, the everyday bonds between people and their animals take on strategic significance. Ukraine’s animals are not on the margins of this war; they are part of the way the country endures it.
Mitzi Perdue is a Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and Co-Founder of Mental Help Global
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
Either Europe will continue allowing Russia’s shadow war to set the terms of escalation, or it will act now to prevent a larger war.
Explore CEPA’s flagship event.
The post Animal Magic: Pets and Vets Aid Ukraine’s Resistance appeared first on CEPA.
2026-04-15 04:57:50
AI already searches, compares, and recommends. It is now becoming able to buy, book, and pay. Instead of browsing websites and completing purchases yourself, AI can find the best option, compare prices, and guide a buyer to a decision. Within limits set by you, it can even complete the purchase.
The new AI-powered buyer, known as agentic commerce, foretells a potentially revolutionary shift that raises challenging regulatory and legal questions. Businesses may no longer compete mainly for human attention. They may need to compete for the attention of the AI actor.
Emerging AI commerce could become a platform for transatlantic cooperation, or fuel additional European concerns about “digital sovereignty.” American companies such as OpenAI are developing the models that power AI agents, while Google and Meta are building tools that let AI search for products, compare options, and move close to completing transactions.
If AI commerce takes hold, the risk is not simply that Europe falls behind. It is that decisions about what gets bought and how transactions happen are shaped by systems built elsewhere, even when the payment itself runs through European infrastructure.
But Europe brings important capabilities. Europe has built strong systems in areas like instant payments and open banking (Pay-by-Bank) and European payment networks and banks are working with Mastercard and Visa to allow AI agents to operate safely within existing payment systems. European payment providers such as Nexi are also working with Google Cloud to build the infrastructure that allows AI agents to execute secure, authorized payments.
Our financial systems were not designed for AI: they assume a person is making each payment. In Europe, strong customer authentication rules require the user to actively approve transactions, in contrast to the more flexible, largely risk-based approaches common in the US.
That works when a person clicks a button. It is hard to apply when AI acts within rules that users have already set. If an AI agent is allowed to act, what counts as approval? Does the user approve each payment, or give permission once? And if something goes wrong, who is responsible? These are simple questions, but regulators so far have not offered clear answers.
Companies are not waiting. They are building solutions to make AI-driven payments safe. Mastercard is working on systems that can record what a user has authorised AI to do and verify each step of a transaction. Visa is testing frameworks that allow AI agents to operate within secure payment environments.
These approaches use tools such as tokenization (replacing sensitive data with a secure digital token) and verification to make payments secure and traceable, so every action can be checked. This is as much about trust as it is about technology.
Although AI is becoming the layer that shapes decisions — determining what options are shown, compared, and selected — it does not yet fully control payments. Purchases still happen through existing platforms and systems. Early experiments, such as Walmart’s attempt to enable checkout inside an AI chat, show both the direction of travel and the limits of current models.
If AI begins to handle both decisions and transactions, it will become a powerful new layer in the economy. AI commerce does not remove payments. It changes when the choice is made. Today, when you pay, different payment providers compete to be used, including cards, wallets, or instant account-to-account. That choice happens at checkout. With AI, that choice can happen earlier. AI can decide what to buy and how to pay. The payment system then just processes the transaction.
Over time, this could shift the advantage toward payment options that are cheapest, fastest, and easiest for AI to use, whether that is cards, pay-by-bank, or even a digital euro if it is introduced.
Without a user actively approving each action, a potentially dangerous gap exists between how Europe’s payment systems work today and how they may need to work in the future. If that gap is not addressed, innovation will move elsewhere, and Europe will follow rather than lead.
But if Europe works with industry, it has a chance to shape how this new model develops. That means setting clear rules on how AI can act, how consent is given, and who is responsible when something goes wrong, focusing on outcomes like trust and accountability rather than prescribing how the technology should be built.
AI is moving from answering questions to taking action. The real question is no longer whether AI can help people shop. It is who will control the systems that decide what gets bought and how, and where those systems are built.
Padraig Nolan is a Fellow with the Tech Policy Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis. He serves as Chief Operating Officer of ETPPA, a prominent EU fintech association. He is also an advisory board member of the Lisbon-based Europe Startup Nations Alliance. Padraig holds a bachelor’s degree in law and economics (University of Galway) and a master’s degree in European law (Utrecht University).
Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions expressed on Bandwidth are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
A Roadmap for Europe-US Tech Cooperation
The post Who Controls the AI Shopping Cart? appeared first on CEPA.
2026-04-14 03:19:50
April 3 was a grimly familiar day for many Ukrainians. Russia was launching hundreds of aerial munitions against key targets with its usual, cold disdain for civilian casualties. By the day’s end, 579 missiles and drones had been fired. It wasn’t the worst attack ever — the Kremlin can now muster up to 1,000 daily — and yet it was serious enough.
Destruction and death were scattered across the country, but there was some reassurance to be had. Ukraine’s air defense system had brought down 541 elements of the swarm.
Of course, there is only limited satisfaction in the recognition that things could have been worse. It still meant 38 missiles and drones had made it through the net, and these often do very serious damage.
Yet the air raids have changed in scope and nature, and something cheering is emerging. Ukraine is getting much better.
Russia has enormously increased the volume of attacks and has now moved away from a largely night-only pattern to a 24-hour-a-day, seven-day-a-week cycle. But as the Institute for Science and International Security detailed in an April 7 report: “Despite record launch volumes, [Russian] hit rates declined, indicating improved interception capabilities, including the growing role of interceptor drones, mobile fire groups, and layered defense systems.”
April 3 was somewhat better than most days: 6% made it through to their targets compared with an 8% average during March. This is a steep fall from last fall, when some months saw almost 19% of drones reach their targets.
Air defense used to mean firing expensive missiles at expensive threats. That remains true, especially as demand for Patriot interceptors is greater than ever. But the character of aerial warfare is changing, as the US and its allies have been reminded in recent weeks. In Ukraine, and increasingly across the Middle East, the fight now also includes mass-produced drones hunting mass-produced drones.
In February, Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov said the aim was to detect all aerial threats in real time and intercept at least 95% of incoming missiles and drones, while building a multi-layered air defense system and raising interceptor production to better protect cities and critical infrastructure. So far, the numbers seem to suggest Kyiv is on track.
“In March, Ukrainian interceptor drones destroyed over 33,000 enemy drones, twice as many as the previous month,” Fedorov said on April 8 in reference to UAV attacks both behind and on the frontline.
Ukraine says its air defenses destroyed or suppressed 89.9% of Russian aerial targets in March, up from 85.6% in February and 80.2% in December. This increased interception rate is also paired with an increase in Russian launch rates, as there was about a 28% increase from February, which was the second straight monthly increase.
“There are just more launches happening, often in periodic waves one after another,” said Norman, a soldier from the unmanned systems battalion of the 60 Separate Mechanized Brigade.
The Kremlin’s emphasis on quantity has been visible for months. In September 2025, Russia was able to launch more than 800 drones in a single night. But as Russia scaled its offensive capacity, Kyiv was scaling production and improving the use of its interceptor drones.
In effect, both sides are now locked in an industrial drone race. For Ukraine, the challenge is to build interceptor drones cheaply, in large numbers, and with steadily improving kill rates. For Russia, it is to manufacture more attack drones while constantly adapting with countermeasures designed to evade interception.
The technology is advancing in many different ways, as a drone pilot from the Bulava unit reportedly downed two Shahed drones with a Sting interceptor from 500 km (311 miles) away.
Deborah Fairlamb, founding partner of Ukraine-focused venture capital firm Green Flag Ventures, added that one in three Russian aerial targets over Ukraine is now destroyed by interceptor drones.
But Ukraine’s success also drives Russia’s search for countermeasures. “Most interceptors are manually flown. They use thermal cameras to see drones at night. This may be a reason why Russia is doing some daytime attacks now, as the sun can damage a thermal sensor,” said Heiner Philipp, an engineer with Technology United for Ukraine. Each side is adapting to the other’s methods in near-real time.
“If you want the 50-100 kg (110-220 lb.) warhead on the Shahed to explode in the air, a 1 kg or greater payload is likely needed. Adding mobile fire teams with machine guns and thermal imagers can reduce costs even further,” Philipp said.
“The core challenge in modern air defense is not just capability, it’s cost and volume,” said Dmytro Kavun, co-founder and president of Dignitas Ukraine, a US-based nonprofit focusing on defense technology innovation. “Even tens of thousands of low-cost interceptors can dramatically reduce the pressure on high-end systems like Patriot by taking on the bulk of drone threats.”
But the search for cheaper interception is not limited to drones. Fire Point, the Ukrainian defense company behind the Flamingo missile, is in talks with European partners to develop a lower-cost alternative to the Patriot system, with the goal of reducing the cost of intercepting a ballistic missile to under $1m.
A cheaper domestically anchored option would ease pressure on Western-supplied interceptor missiles, worth millions, while making Ukraine’s broader air defense shield more sustainable.
Yet higher interception rates do not eliminate the danger. As Russia modifies its drones with larger and more specialized warheads, the consequences of even a small number of penetrations become more severe.
“Russia has adapted its warhead loadout for various targets, from standard and enhanced high-explosive fragmentation warheads to thermobaric and heavier 90-kg warheads, which increases the destructive effect but often reduces the range,” said Serhii Kuzan, chair of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center.
Ukraine’s improving defense model is the result of sustained effort. Vitaliy Goncharuk, the former chairman of the country’s Artificial Intelligence Committee, said that over the past 18 months, a layered air defense network against Shahed drones has been built in parallel to greater propeller-driven interceptor drone output. That combination, he says, has made the current model far more effective.
“Aircraft-type interceptors are better suited for longer loiter times and more complex targets,” said Kavun. “The key is not one ‘best’ system, but matching the right tool to the right threat and doing it at scale.” The Ukrainian Air Force says its newly acquired Mirage jets are achieving a 98% hit rate against drones and cruise missiles.
Goncharuk also warns that a more serious challenge is emerging. Russia is increasingly moving toward Shahed and Geran variants equipped with jet engines, effectively turning them into low-cost cruise-missile-like weapons that are harder for propeller-based interceptors to stop. Countering that will require a different set of solutions, above all, cheap short-range missile systems and, over time, potentially laser-based defenses.
Still, Ukraine’s response shows how quickly necessity can reshape battlefield conditions. Under sustained Russian pressure, Kyiv has learned not only to field cheaper interceptor drones at scale, but to apply the same logic of rapid wartime adaptation to more advanced systems such as missile systems. The result is an air defense model that began with Ukrainian drones, but is rapidly expanding across a variety of technologies.
David Kirichenko is a Ukraine-based freelance journalist and a regular contributor to Europe’s Edge at CEPA. He is an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society and can be found on X/Twitter @DVKirichenko
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
Either Europe will continue allowing Russia’s shadow war to set the terms of escalation, or it will act now to prevent a larger war.
Explore CEPA’s flagship event.
The post Ukraine’s Air Defenses — World Class, and Improving appeared first on CEPA.
