2025-05-10 01:44:05
Evgeny Roshchin
Okay, so I think we are ready to start. Hello and welcome everyone to this Center for European Policy Analysis call about the strategic relationship between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. I am Evgeny Roshchin, a future Russia fellow, and I’m privileged to chair this session. And before we start, I just need to say a few words of procedure. Well, first of all, this is a on the record meeting, and second of all, while we will be discussing with our experts, I encourage you to ask questions in the chat or just by raising your hand, and then we will find a way to give you the floor. So now let me introduce an excellent panel that we have assembled for you. We have three participants today, and I’ll start with Mathieu Boulegue, who is our senior fellow with transatlantic defense and security team here at the Center for European Policy Analysis. Then we have Marija Golubeva, our Distinguished Fellow with Democratic resilience team, also at CEPA. And Tamas Matura, our Senior Fellow with Democratic resilience team, also Center for European Policy Analysis. And I would like to start with a very broad question about Xi and Putin’s strategic relationship. It is expected that Chairman Xi will attend Victory Day celebrations in Moscow in the coming days, and as it transpired over the weekend, the visit will be held for 4 days, which is quite exceptional, although not so unusual, because Xi had similarly long visits to the United States and to Brazil. However, given the fact that they spoke over the phone in February and then had a video conference in January, and previously they had an extended meeting during the BRICS summit in Kazan, we can actually safely conclude that this is a remarkably intense both strategic and personal relationship and perhaps engagement. So, I would like to ask our experts a broad question of how you might assess the current state of Russia-China relations. How aligned do you think these two countries are, and what can tell us about their grand strategy? And for these opening words, I first turn, Mathieu, to you.
Mathieu Boulègue
Thank you very much, Evgeny, and it’s a great way to open the discussion. So Xi has confirmed, contrary to a lot of European leaders who seem to have fallen ill in the past few days. So let’s see if Xi still RSVPs for May 7, ahead of May 9. I think you pointed out in your question, Evgeny, in your introduction, that it’s, it’s a really interpersonal, strategic relationship. And I think there is a lot of focus that needs to be put on the nature of the relation between Xi and Putin themselves, right? It has to be very interpersonal relationship that is also independent from the relationship that both countries have. And I think Putin and Xi have learned to work together, have learned to set potential differences aside to make it work on a personal level. Now, it doesn’t mean that both Russia and China need to be necessarily allies. They don’t need to be friends. They don’t need to be, you know, reaching strategic levels of relationship to make it work. And I think this is fundamentally the nature of this sort of very commented on and hot button relationship that we try to analyze is that it doesn’t work the way that Western relations do. We tend to analyze Russia, China relations with the same analytical framework as Western relations. You know, from NATO relations to European Union relations and so on transatlantic relations, because Western countries need to be friends with their allies. They don’t accept forms of hypocrisy or double crossing or sort of competition cooperation. We want to be friends. Russia and China don’t have to work like this. They need to be transactionally okay to work on certain areas of cooperation, but still be able to rip each other to guts if they have to on other areas. There is also, you know, a lot of friction points in that relationship. But as long as business works in many ways, they can, they can have that relationship continue and further. So I think there is a lot of analysis that needs to focus really on the substance and less on the label, which is also something that we’ve learned to appreciate, I think, in the research community, that we’ve spent a lot of time trying to understand the very substance, of what the very label, sorry, of what they do. Are they in a sort of strategic relationship? Is it no limit that a partnership? You know, I think we need to look at the substance, and that substance, once again, to come back to your question, is really liquid. It’s very fluid. It really depends on what area they are discussing. They can be friends on one end or cooperating on one end and then ripping each other apart on others, and be actually competitors on certain aspects of their relationship. So it’s much more complicated than meets the eye. And finally, lastly, to come back to May 9th, the symbols generally overtake the substance. There’s a lot of performing of that relationship. We see Xi going to Moscow. We see Putin going to Beijing. We see a lot of exchanges between the two men and then sort of patriotic displays of togetherness, but it’s very much the symbols right that we also get wowed by the symbols. And we want to look at the symbols because it is also a testament to our willingness to see that relationship further right, because we tend to analyze them in the context of their cooperation, or strategic cooperation. They’ve clearly understood that in both capitals, and they play on it in terms of sort of psychological warfare against us. So a lot of symbols, a lot of performance around that relationship. But it’s interesting to look at the real substance, but to be discussed.
Evgeny Roshchin
Thanks a lot, Mathieu for this great opening. And I do agree that symbols are probably the things that Moscow now cares most of all, perhaps much more than over some things that might have strategic importance at the moment. But with this, I would like to turn to Marija and ask Marija, how do you view this visit in terms of the strategic engagement between two leaders and the two countries?
Marija Golubeva
Well, of course, viewed from Europe, it does raise the question whether one of those many dimensions of potential cooperation, or increased cooperation, might be a continuation of indirect but, but on the other hand, very tangible support for for the Russian war effort. And that’s of course, something that for Europe should be worrying. It is true that China has a certain vision of multilateralism, which is very different from how say we in Europe to see multilateralism and China does, does see multilateralism as a form of agenda, to promote globally as an opposition to what they see as some kind of monopolization of power, or axis of power, which is US and Europe ten thirds in the past. I mean, of course, encapsulated a lot since the second Presidency of Donald Trump again. But overall, that has been the Chinese vision that the West is pushing its agenda, and countries like China, Brazil, Russia, etc, should push back with their vision of multilateralism. But in fact, of course, it’s a very transactional vision of multilateralism, and I completely agree with what has been said before. It’s the perception that that you, you promote multilateralism as long as it suits you, and in a form that suits you. In the case with Russia, it means that you allow Russia to play in what China allows it to keep for now, as it’s kind of geopolitical area of influence, and then you you see what you can do about expanding your own area, and possibly at the expense of Russia. But that’s a different–it’s the next stage in the story, so to say. So, I think, from a European perspective, strategically, this doesn’t mean that China is great friends of Russia, but it still might mean that China is going to continue supporting Russia’s war effort, and that is troubling.
Evgeny Roshchin
Thanks a lot. Marija, before I go to Tamas, I would still like to remind everyone who is with us on this call that you are more than welcome to ask questions in the chat or otherwise by raising your hand. And Tamas, could you share your views on this upcoming visit and celebrations in Moscow?
Tamás Matura
Yes, thank you for having me, Evgeny, today. So it’s hard to add anything really more substantial than–after the two previous speakers. But what I would like to point out is to is the strategic and structural contradiction between China’s relations to Russia and China’s relations to Europe. What I mean by that is it’s very obvious that, given the current American administration’s policies towards China, China really, really needs Russia in many aspects, trade-wise, energy resources-wise, and so on and so forth. But the very same American policies towards China in the past couple of months have pushed Beijing back towards Europe. We have heard about how the Chinese plan to cancel the sanctions against European Parliament members. We see how the Chinese attempt to reignite the negotiation about the investment partnership between the two sides. And there is a contradiction we have to pay attention to. So to sum it up into one single sentence, I think a lot of European observers will be looking at and listening to Xi Jinping speech in in Moscow. Will he talk about, in a meaningful way, about peace in Ukraine? Will China change its fundamental approach towards supporting Russia and its war effort against Ukraine, which would facilitate its relationship with Europe, or will we see, the very same Chinese approach we’ve been observing in the past two, three years, where China supports Russia and at the same time tries to cozy up to Europe? I don’t think that both of China’s approach can be maintained in the long run simultaneously. Thank you,
Evgeny Roshchin
Tamas, if I may, I would like to ask a follow up question on this. China’s peace initiative was endorsed by Brazil, and given that there is an upcoming BRICS summit this summer in Brazil, do you think that might have some role to play in the upcoming meeting between Putin and Xi?
Tamás Matura
I’m quite sure that they are going to discuss it, especially that the last time I checked, President Lula will be also attending the meeting–I mean the commemoration in Moscow in the upcoming few days. So it would be really strange if these, if these 2, 3, 4 people, didn’t discuss the upcoming summit in Brazil. But Brazil is not a European country, is not a major security guarantor, and cannot be in Ukraine. So their support, I think, it’s more symbolic than really meaningful, at least from a European perspective.
Evgeny Roshchin
Okay, okay, right? Since we’ve touched upon the relationship within this alliance and the implications of this alliance to the transatlantic alliance, I would like to ask you, Mathieu, about whether to think there is a room to exploit for Russia in China, in the transatlantic relationships? Given the state of the relations between the United States and Europe, and given how plural the assessment of this relationship in Europe are, so is there any leverage that Russia and China perhaps could use to drive the United States further away from Europe?
Mathieu Boulègue
It’s a really good question. I think Tamas made an incredibly important point about the fact that China also needs to factor in the way the war against Ukraine is going, the way the transatlantic community is also evolving around that question and potential us support around that sort of step carefully and balance their interest with Russia, without Russia, and then with Europe and without Europe, and then with the US and without the US. So it is, you know, a complicated relationship for China to deal with, not least because they are not actor to the war, they are not a party to it. They would want, ideally, to be a party to any forms of peace negotiations or settlements and whatever you want to call it. But they need to tread very carefully, right, depending on where the wind goes. And I think this is important to look at in terms of what China can actually do, in terms of potentially building these rifts against the transatlantic community and within the community itself. Now, of course, there is a strong interest, let’s be honest, between Russia and China to break that relationship right, to redo the rules according to their visions of the world, whether it is a more pro-Chinese vision of the world or a more pro-Moscow, you know, interpretation of rules and governance, not least in the context of the war against Ukraine. So there is, of course, this willingness to force multiply, I wouldn’t necessarily say cooperate, but at least force multiply where they can exploit and endanger that transatlantic relationship and community in effect. And in essence, this is things that we have seen and we’ve learned to live and adapt to for the past 15 years, or something, in terms of information warfare, in terms of governance changes on the ground, in terms of Information engineering and interpretation of what the truth really is on the world stage. And this is something that, once again, we have learned to sort of live with and increasingly encapsulate against. If you look at certain responses from European countries against Russian information warfare, in the Baltic states, for instance, in the Nordic countries, they’re at the forefront of this. And I think Tamas will have a lot of things to say about that. Yet, you know, there is always space for exploitation when it comes to sub-threshold warfare activities, when it comes to sort of below the threshold or gray zone activities to try to create these rifts. I think Greenland was also an interesting an interesting latest example when it comes to Chinese overture to Greenland in terms of economic activism. Now the United States becoming increasingly interested in economic activities in Greenland, and Russia also having its say right in the region because of its posture in the Arctic. So a lot of things going on here for both countries to exploit. And once again, they don’t really have to end up having a sort of strategic vision of what the future should be, as long as they can contest and compete against what they perceive to be Western supremacy, and at least United American supremacy when it comes to imposing rules and governance in the on the world. Which means that we now have, I think, this sort of appeal, and I’ll finish on this, on the sort of bricks plus format we have seen for the past few years. Russia and China both try to take the cover onto themselves when it comes to reaching out to third party countries in a developing world, the sort of bricks plus, or bricks extended format, which is also has a lot to do what you were mentioning about Brazil and Brazil’s willingness to be more active in peace negotiations, or peace negotiations, quote, unquote, in the context of the war. And I think this is something that we will see increased competition between Russia and China right to reach out to the developing world and their own visions of the future, which may or may not align with Russia’s view or the Chinese view, and I’ll stop there.
Evgeny Roshchin
Thank you, Mathieu. I see that we have questions coming in chat, and I encourage others to join the question list. Before I turn to the questions, I would still like to ask Marija–if Marija, you could talk to us more about the potential plurality of perspectives in Europe on Russia and China relations. Since we touched on this topic, I want to stay for a few minutes longer to give you a chance to actually elaborate on it more if you could speak on that, a little bit that that I would appreciate,
Marija Golubeva
I think what might increasingly differentiate Europe in the next couple of years, given that Europe now has this ambition to act a bit more autonomously from the US than before, as a reaction to the change in the White House and the change of approach might Be that European insistence on issues of international law regarding territorial acquisitions. So to say, speaking, not just about the Crimea, but but the whole, the whole aspect of territorial settlement in Ukraine is going to be solidified, rather than liquefied, so to say, rather than made softer by by the somewhat pivoting approach from the US. And as a result of that, I would imagine that Europe’s capacity to accommodate cooperation with China, even though Europe does need it very much. As far as climate policies are concerned, Chinese technologies are indispensable. Europe still is going to, I think, try to set Europe as a whole is going to try to set limits to how much cooperation is possible if China follow suit from Russian example, which is now, according increasingly tolerated by the US, to actually to change the outline of borders in its own sphere of influence. So to say, speaking, first of all, of Taiwan, but not just that necessarily. The question is, will Europe be just paying lip service to this, to the international law and the requirements that territories are not changing hands so easily, or will Europe be pursuing a policy of really not going, going with changes like that? If the second happens, which is still feasible, because I think the majority of the EU countries are fairly staunch so far on the issues of Ukraine and Crimea, then I don’t think that cooperation with China will be as limitless as it might have otherwise become, given China’s need to have a good partner somewhere in the West for its trade, for its economy when the US is not available. So there is, I think, a friction there that is going to make cooperation with Europe, economic cooperation with Europe, a bit more problematic in the next couple of years, unless, of course, China also starts paying lip service to to international law and and the observance of of borders in including an armed conflicts, which I don’t think It will do in a very direct way.
Evgeny Roshchin
Marija, thank you for this. I was just wondering if you could tell us anything at all about possible national differences in perspectives on Russia-China relations within Europe.
Marija Golubeva
Well, I do think we can expect differences, of course, in Hungary’s position, possibly in Slovakia is possibly with the changes in in Romania’s position. But I don’t quite expect that the majority of EU countries are going to to change their positions very much in the near future. And I think with a stronger Germany, with a stronger sense of political direction in Germany. I mean, I think there is going to be a bit more of a backbone in the European position, specifically on international law, specifically on the issues of land changing hands and borders changing.
Evgeny Roshchin
Thanks for that. With this, I’ll turn to the questions we’ve received so far, and we have a question from Jordan, Jordan Dahl, who is asking whether we can speak more to why China’s approach of supporting Russia and causing up to Europe won’t work in the long run. What would be the linchpin there for that strategy to stop being effective? Tamas, do you think I could pass this question over to you? And then perhaps, Mathieu, could–you could jump in if you feel like.
Tamás Matura
Yes, absolutely. And let me start with the part of the question, how does Trump factor in this? I think the fundamental economic structural problem between Europe and China is very simple. China is in the desperate need of a final consumer, and that final consumer, for the past 30-40 years, has been, or was the United States of America and Europe to a lesser extent. Now, China wants to cozy up to Europe to turn Europe into this final consumer status, if the United States is indeed fed up with consuming all of the Chinese exports. Now the big question is whether Europe is ready to take this position. I don’t think we are. I don’t think that we should, despite the fact that some of the European governments in the past couple of weeks have been indicating a change in this attitude. I believe that even if Europe shows some signs of getting closer to China, it is probably a negotiation tactic to show to the American administration that we have other options. But in reality, I don’t really think that we have other options, because we don’t want to be the new America that cuts back its industrial output even more just to accommodate China’s beggar thy neighbor policies. So that is, that is the structural economic tension between the two. And here again, for to to turn to the first part of the question, I think there’s the geopolitical structural tension between China and the EU in particular, between China and Central European countries, the very same central European countries that used to have this 16 plus one cooperation for almost a decade now, these countries, with the notable exception of Hungary and to a lesser extent, Slovakia have turned their back. I think Marija is much better place to talk about this, being on the border with Russia, but Poland, the Czech Republic and to–I’m not sure about the future of Romania, but so far, Romania and all of these countries have been super critical of China’s support to Russia in a war that is just a couple of hundreds of kilometers away from our capital cities. So I think that is the reason that China cannot really honestly push these two strategies at the same time, at least from a European perspective, I don’t think it sends the right message to Europe. Of course, should the war end in Ukraine anytime soon? At least this second structural problem could evaporate to a certain extent, but I don’t think that even that, even in that case, trust towards China would return that easily, at least in Central Europe.
Evgeny Roshchin
Mathieu? Would you like to jump in?
Mathieu Boulègue
Yeah, just for a few words, because I want to be, you know, politically, not incorrect, but much more thought provoking in the sense that Beijing is very smart in their approach to Russia, because they’ve never over, at least, you know, supported the war. They’ve never sided with Russia. They’ve never acknowledged, at least that they’ve been providing potential lethal military aid they’re doing through North Korea, which is much easier, and they have been stepping, you know, on eggshells, to make sure that they are not seen as a party that takes sides. Now let’s project that 50 years onwards, right when China feels sufficiently confident about their own sense of power to become a potential unilateral hegemonic country that is able to impose its own rules of governance. I think they’ve clearly understood in Beijing that Russia is only a regional power, right? Something that, back in the day President Obama was already saying, which, of course, irked people in Moscow, as you can understand, but it is very much so. Russia remains a regional power with nukes and steroids and the ability to wreak havoc in Europe and tragically, invade countries and destroy them from within. Now smaller countries or regional powers like that need to balance their interests. They cannot impose their rules. And God knows that the Kremlin have been trying to impose their own rules and their old divisions, and, you know, Moscow’s rules and so on that colleagues and I have been working on it for years, with no avail. They cannot impose their rules. There’s no such thing as the ability for Russia to push for a world view with a soft power that resonates and the ability to change governance facts on the ground. China does. China has that ability. They have the geo-economic power. They have the geo-technological power to do it. They just need the geopolitics. And that is something that they are slowly turning into by becoming a sort of de facto hegemon in many parts of the world who wants the rules of the game, who want these rules of the game. So I think that’s going to be interesting to see, actually, how Russia will position itself, not how China positions itself with Russia, but how Moscow needs to suck it up to Beijing if they want to continue evolving in that relationship. That’s, you know, maybe for the next Kremlin, maybe for the next leader in Russia, and maybe for the next 10 to 15 to 20 years. But this will happen. Russia needs China much more than the opposite is true, and I think this is going to be an increasingly way to def–increasingly a way to define that relationship, moving forward with Russia being, of course, very unhappy with it, and trying to do its best to undermine that relationship.Once again, the symbols are more important than the substance, and within that substance a lot of friction, which is something that we need to learn to adapt to and potentially exploit. That’s, you know, the policy, the policy angle to it.
Evgeny Roshchin
Thanks for this punch line, Mathieu. We have a question about the competition of political models, so to say. And it comes from Sasha Magnani, I’m sorry if I mispronounced your surname. So the question is, since Russia and China provide an alternative model to liberal democracies in the West, in what ways is Putin-Xi relationship debilizing the EU and NATO unity? And if I may, Marija, I would like to address this question to you, if you feel comfortable to take it
Marija Golubeva
Well, I don’t think that, to be quite honest. I don’t think there is a real kind of regime alternative there, right? I don’t think any European country, even the ones who are in their foreign policy, are very sympathetic, at times to China or even to Russia, is considering, or their population would countenance a real regime change in the direction of something they have in China or in Russia. So I think that when we’re speaking about challenge, it’s more the challenge in the information in information manipulation area, it’s more the challenge in terms of how stable can you keep your system if we keep trying really hard to destabilize it? That kind of challenge, for sure, is very, very real and tangible, both from China and from Russia. But that’s a bit different from an alternative that the population at large or the political elites would want to follow. I think political elites that would want to follow any similar model are still in very stark minority in EU countries.
Evgeny Roshchin
Thanks so much for taking it. We also have a couple of broader geopolitical questions. I would like to start with Russia’s relations with North Korea, and the question comes from [unintelligible] again, my apologies for mispronouncing the name. And the question is Xi uncomfortable with the new alliance between Putin and Kim Jong Un?Mathieu. do you think I could turn this to you and Tamas, feel free to jump in when Mathieu is finished.
Mathieu Boulègue
Thanks Evgeny, it’s a great question. [unintelligible] So look, I’m going to be counterintuitive here, but nothing would have happened between Pyongyang and Moscow if Beijing hadn’t been aware and given it, it’s green light, okay. This is, you know, the whole, “oh, we’re surprised this happened in the first place” that Beijing sent terms of official messaging and the words of “oh, and surprise the discovering this new thing”, come on. Let’s cut the, you know, let’s cut the the proverbal, you know, stuff. And let’s call it for what it is. This is not how diplomacy and geopolitics work. Of course, China knew, of course, Beijing is very comfortable with that relationship, and of course, they’ve been actually promoting it as a way to indirectly support the war against Ukraine, right? This is the best way that China has to actually send lethal military assistance to Russia without actually calling it so. Now, what does it mean in the essence? Nothing happens in Pyongyang without China knowing what’s happening. And that level of relationship, whether it is sort of, I wouldn’t call it an alliance, I just call it a sort of a circumstantial agreement between two powers who need each other that have the blessing of the higher power, which is China, and that relationship. It doesn’t make it an alliance, doesn’t make it a friendship, just makes it an opportune collaboration to that fits the bill of that foots the bill, sorry, of the 3 countries. So good way for China to prop up the Pyongyang regime and keep using it as a pawn on the international stage and keep, you know, our attention diverted. It’s a good way for Russia to obtain military assistance, and it’s also a good way for Pyongyang to export their own interest. So are they comfortable? Yeah. Are they uncomfortable? No, of course, quite the opposite. Right to come back to the core question. Will this relationship grow further? Yes, probably, maybe. I mean, there is always space for more military collaboration between both countries. There might even be space for a more official form of support from Moscow to the Pyongyang regime. Now we’d love to see what the sort of, you know, addendum that we will never see, or the sort of two page addendum in that relationship that is of the records and in that is kept very secret between the three countries on what is it that China is getting in return for this? What are they getting from the Kremlin to allow for that sort of pipeline of weapons and military assistance that I would love to see. I have my guesses. I can have ideas, but I think it’s just, you know, spitballing and hypotheses that are not another place today that would be a great event actually to run.
Evgeny Roshchin
Thanks so much for spen–spelling out this perspective for us, Mathieu. And Tamas, if I may, I would like to add a further question for you, which is also from Sasha. Do you believe the relationship between Xi and Putin will be degraded by international countries balancing their geopolitical goals between deterring Russian advances while managing economic dependencies on China? Feel free to take whichever question you like, either this or the one on North Korea.
Tamás Matura
Alright, just a couple of thoughts in North Korea. And of course, I have to say that I’m speculating here, because none of us has a direct line to Kim Jong Un and while I absolutely agree to what Mathieu you just said, to play a little bit of a devil’s advocate, what we’ve what we know for sure so far that the Ukrainian forces found North Korean happy weaponry in Ukraine, right? So that is for sure that when it comes to artillery shells, self propelled artillery, whatever there are North Korean happy weaponry found in Ukraine. Nobody has found so far, Chinese weapon systems. I mean full weapon systems in Ukraine. Which means that if China indeed uses North Korea to send some kind of dual use equipment or other lower level equipment to Russia, that is possible, but I don’t think that it’s necessary, because China has been supplying dual use and other relatively low level equipment to Russia directly. So I’m not sure that they really need North Korea for that, but I’m just speculating here, and I can imagine that we shouldn’t forget that the Chinese foreign policy making is not as centralized as many believe. So it can easily happen that in provincial leaders in Hailong Tian or Jilin provinces close to North Korea play their own little games and then Beijing learns about it afterwards, when it’s already too late. So that’s another option, but I don’t think I have enough information to go into that. When it comes to the other question, I’m not sure that I precisely understand that. If it means that countries have to take into consideration that, for example, European countries, that we have security concerns with abi–Russia, while we have to balance out our our economic dependence on China. Yes, absolutely, that is, that is a major issue. But I think those are two very different issues, because at least from Central European perspective now, lives are at stake, and the security of Europe is at stake, which is a very new phenomenon, at least in the past 30 years, it hasn’t happened so far. And another thing that it’s on the Central European point of view, just to you know, pass the ball back to Mathieu. In the past couple of months or even years, President Macron of France used to be, has been very, very active in this regard. But probably the major watershed will be how the next German government behaves vis-a-vis this question, because Germany is definitely the country that has the strongest economic relations to China. The German economy is the one through which many of the Central European countries have a certain level of indirect dependency on China. So for example, in the case of Hungary, less than 2% of our trade, of our export, goes to China, directly, but indirectly, another two to 3% through Germany. So I think the German decision will be the really important one to watch, and probably it will unfold in the next couple of weeks.
Evgeny Roshchin
Fascinating. Thanks so much. Tamas. Marija, I think I would like to bring in you on the next question coming from Greg Sullivan. And Greg is perhaps referring us to the beginning of our conversation by asking Xi’s upcoming trip to Russia seems like a rather long trip for a foreign leader abroad, especially to ostensibly commemorate a memorial day. What is Xi hoping to gain from this upcoming visit? And is there any other dimension to this visit than differs from the past visits, and like I indicated in the beginning, indeed, if you put it into perspective of their early engagements, even this year, it does look like a remarkable engagement between two leaders. So I would like to hear your perspectives, and if you could comment also on the whole issue from from the perspective of bureaucratic politics. It would also be fascinating, because if you have two leaders of the state, you know, controlling and managing relations so closely, you know, it gives them the opportunity to push an agenda more effectively forward than it would have been otherwise. So I wonder what you make of it. And then Mathieu and Tamas, feel free to chip in if you feel like.
Marija Golubeva
Well, as has been mentioned today in the beginning, this is not the first time that Xi is making a four day long visit to a country in the BRICS in the BRICS circle, so to say. So, I wouldn’t overestimate the meaning of the length of visit, or indeed connect the length to the substance. I agree with Mathieu that actually symbolic meaning is important, or at least as important in this case. But of course, they do have a lot of issues to discuss, if one just looks around bricks and bricks, plus things that are happening or about to happen, they probably would want to discuss the perspective of Iran’s situation with Israel and the USA. They might want to discuss issues around the economic growth prospects and challenges for BRICS countries or prepare, as already mentioned before, for the summit in Brazil. So there are, there is a number of issues that they do, that they do have joint interest in, that they could discuss, especially with Putin’s ambition to be a kind of global power despite the real regional power status. And I think there is–even that is a sufficient explanation for why so long. But I do tend to agree that symbolic meaning of a long visit, in this case, or ceremonial meaning that takes the first place of right, so to say.
Evgeny Roshchin
Thanks so much, Marija. And I wondered, Mathieu, If you could add any perhaps in the way of speculation, probably specifics to this possible conversation in Moscow in the upcoming week, perhaps by looking at the kind of issues they might discuss regarding their joint policies towards the Arctic and access to rare materials, especially in light of perhaps a broader vision that the new Trump’s administration has for their cooperation with Russia and possibly a China Deal.
Mathieu Boulègue
Thank you, Evgeny and yeah, to to exactly piggyback on what Marija was saying, I think it’s very true, right? There’s going to be a lot of symbols, also, the length is important, right? But we all know how these things work. There’s going to be a flurry of diplomats and small hands working in the shadows to, you know, propose some deals. And then the official statements by Xi and Putin, saying, okay, we agreed to this and this and this so that, which is probably why it’s going to take a while, because they have a lot to discuss. And I think we could expect a flurry of statements across these four or five days of trip that will touch upon the sort of whole scope of full spectrum of that relationship, right from BRICS to Brazil’s proposal concerning the war against Ukraine, to, you know, increasing collaboration there, or to power of Siberia, actually. [unintelligible] you have a question on this, which I believe is not going anywhere, to potential deals in terms of raw materials or critical minerals in the Arctic, for instance. I think this is what we’re going to see moving forward in these few days is like a lot of statements that we in the West will interpret as increased collaboration. But then it’s a question of the follow through more than anything. Power Siberia, for instance, the pipeline is a good point on this. It’s been announced decades ago. It’s still not going anywhere. There’s still a lot of riff-raff around the exact lining, and Mongolia is now putting a lot of brakes on it. China’s just signed a new deal with Kazakhstan in terms of gas. China is less interested in Russian gas than it was before. It’s more interested now, and to come back to your question, Evgeny on raw minerals and critical critical minerals, and rare earths in the Arctic, potentially. And I think this is going to be the new phase of China’s approach in Russia’s Arctic, similar as the US approach to the Arctic, with Greenland, for instance, or Norway on critical minerals. So I think there’s going to be a race there, something to keep tabs on in the coming in the coming years, if there really is a scramble for resources in the Arctic, besides, you know fish and fish fish stocks, I think it’s going to be critical minerals and rare earths on this particular aspect.
Evgeny Roshchin
Mathieu, I know you have to jump off quite soon. So therefore…
Mathieu Boulègue
Yeah in about five minutes…five, six minutes.
Evgeny Roshchin
Thanks so much for this contribution. Tamas, will you have anything to add to this question?
Tamás Matura
To be frank, I think the two previous speakers covered everything about it. What I would like to second is that most of these diplomatic missions have done a lot of bureaucratic details, what are not well known or unknown to us, and then, as an excellent observer, sometimes we attach great importance to issues that are actually based on tiny little issues. So I wouldn’t, I wouldn’t add or attach too much of a significance to the length of this visit. It could be about a bureaucratic or it could be because of any kind of bureaucratic issues.
Evgeny Roshchin
Okay, okay, so let’s move on, perhaps for a final round of questions. And yeah, they have just a new one added to the chat, which is from Max Seddon: how could the US-Russia discussions about political and economic affect Russia’s relations with China? Could the US, as some policy makers hope, pull off reverse Nixon by peeling Russia away from China, and I guess it’s such a broad question that we all have been struggling with. So I suggest I start with Marija, and then Mathieu and tamas. Again, I would invite you to jump in, Matheiu…
Mathieu Boulègue
Can I just jump in before? Because I need to leave, unfortunately, to take my daughter…
Evgeny Roshchin
That’s right. Okay, let’s reverse it….
Mathieu Boulègue
Yeah, I’ll just be very quick. I think the answer is, Evgeny, you should take this one, because I know you have a lot of things to say on it. You know, wedge policy, reverse Nixon, reverse Kissinger, as we’ve heard it before. We’ve always–we’ve been discussing this. It’s a great question, Max, actually, good to see you. Since you know already the Biden era or the Trump one era, my famous last words would be, whatever we do to try to create rifts or wedges between Russia and China will backfire, because there’s nothing that we can do to try to exploit that won’t make them go closer together, right? And then it’s a question of the devils and the details, and then we need maybe to try at some point. But I think if we really want to insist, strategically speaking, on trying to create those rifts and sort of yeah, factors inside the relationship, it will backfire on us, and we’ll pay the cost. On this note, I have to run. Thank you very much.
Evgeny Roshchin
Mathieu, thanks so much for your contribution. It was good having you. Tamas, if I may, I would like to bring you in now.
Tamás Matura
Yeah, well, it’s a very complex question, but I think the answer is very simple, no. So no way to drive a wedge between the Russians and the Chinese, as of today and in the foreseeable future. As many allies has already pointed out when Nixon and Kissinger were able to do so, that was mostly due that there had been already some wedges and tensions between the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China and the Chinese state before Nixon and Kissinger even had this idea. So right now we see a very, very different development between Russia and China. They are getting closer together, and they do need each other, at least for the foreseeable future. Should, once again, should the war end in Ukraine, I think that could lead to a very different scenario. But even in that case, I can’t really foresee any plausible scenarios in the next 5 to 10 years when Russia and China could drift apart, either on–by themselves or either by any kind of external forces. On that note, there is a–there is one more thing: we shouldn’t forget, the importance that both of these countries are led by authoritarian leaders, and they are not young. So, what could really change the situation is, is a change of leadership, either in or both in China and in Russia. But, but I don’t think anyone could even slightly forecast the domestic consequences of such a change, especially in Russia, but also in China. So, I don’t even dare to dwell into those details.
Evgeny Roshchin
Thanks so much. Marija, would you like to add anything to what have been said…
Marija Golubeva
I do tend to agree that as long as Putin is in power in Russia, I don’t think that there is any feasible model of of Russia becoming closer to any Western Power than to China. That is just not possible, because Putin defines himself in terms of anti Western rally around the flag, kind of sentiment and attempts to exploit this to the maximum, as his recent interview of 25 years in power has illustrated, redefining, again, the meaning of Russian values as being non western or anti western values. So it’s very shallow. It’s a very shallow ideology, but it’s very consistent. And as such, I think it’s it’s not going to change, as long as he remains inpower. Therefore, China is always going to be, in terms of political mobilization, a more desirable partner than any Western country, including the US, no matter how, how much the White House might try.
Evgeny Roshchin
Thanks so much, Maria. And I think, by way of wrapping up, I’ll share five cents of my own on this question. Indeed, to start with ideology, I would totally agree with Marija. However, Russian ideology seems to be very elastic, so to say, on the number of issues. For instance, recently we saw a certain split in this ideological coverage emerging, which now starts to differentiate between the United States and Europe. Now all the problems are somehow rising up from Europe, not from the United States. So it–they portray the old world as, you know, being corrupt and losing its core values. But then, I also believe symbols and symbolical gestures tell us a lot about the prospects of driving a wedge between Russia and China. Again, when Trump made the first steps on the path of his initiative, Putin was quick to call Beijing and discuss the progress in negotiations with Xi, I think, with the intent to create certainty and clarity as to Moscow’s moves towards the United States. Following that, Russian foreign minister in a public interview, an orchestrated public interview with foreign journalists, emphasized that there will be no pivoting away from the east. It is their main stake. So in terms of symbolical gestures, they’re all done to emphasize the current state of progressing cooperation. At the same time, I think Moscow would like the West to have an impression that they are open to the west, trying to drive a wedge. So they are open, you know, for the initiatives from from Washington or even from Brussels, and they will use it as their own leverage when negotiating a better deal. But the truth is, currently, as all our speakers suggested, Russia’s economy and military effort is completely dependent on China, and China proved itself as a reliant supplier of all that support to Moscow, as opposed to all other countries. And I think this is the bet that Moscow will stick to when it comes to any reverse Nixon strategy. And I think with this, I’ll finish, and I would just like to thank all our panelists for excellent contributions, as well as our brilliant journalists for excellent questions. I’m sorry if we didn’t manage to answer them in full, but I believe we tried our best. So with this, I would like to turn the table to Sarah Krajewski to wrap up this CEPA call.
Sarah Krajewski
Thanks everyone. Thanks for your questions, and as always, to our panelists for their expertise. If you have any follow up questions, please reach out to [email protected], be glad to connect you with anyone on the panel today. I will send out a recording and transcript in the coming kind of hours, and a full transcript will be available on our website in the next week or so. Again, stay tuned for more of these coming up, but Thanks all for your time. Enjoy the rest of your day.
The post Russia-China Relations appeared first on CEPA.
2025-05-10 01:18:43
The most recent quarterly earnings results of Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, and Microsoft offer insights into how the Trump administration’s tariffs might affect tech companies’ capital expenditures on data centers and other infrastructure that supports their AI efforts. For now, the impact appears minimal, but in the medium and long term, US tariffs could have significant effects on companies’ artificial intelligence-related investments.
The four companies are still making enormous outlays. Together, they reported capital expenditures of almost $77 billion for the quarter. For context, that’s more than the US government spends annually on highways and bridges and more than three times NASA’s annual budget.
Given the uncertainty around the Trump administration’s decisions, it’s too early to know the ultimate impact of tariffs on these tech investments. An important caveat is the administration’s decision to implement a 90-day pause and exemptions specifically for semiconductors and related components. The pause likely softened and delayed some immediate effects on capital investment, giving companies a short-term window to accelerate purchases and stockpile components. Uncertainty remains high because this relief might be temporary and subject to future trade agreements.
Amazon’s Q1 earnings call reflected both this uncertainty and the preemptive actions that companies are taking to respond. During the call, Amazon said it “pulled forward inventory in Q1 ahead of anticipated tariffs.” Going forward, Amazon stated that it’s “hard to tell what will happen with tariffs right now. It’s hard to tell where they will settle and when they will settle.”
Although Meta did not tie current capital spending levels to tariffs, it acknowledged that trade dynamics are driving up the price of infrastructure hardware. The company noted that the “higher cost we expect to incur for infrastructure hardware this year really comes from suppliers who source from countries around the world,” and that there’s “just a lot of uncertainty around this given the ongoing trade discussions.”
Microsoft acknowledged tariff-related effects more indirectly, noting during its earnings call that “tariff uncertainty resulted in inventory levels that remained elevated.”
In contrast to its peers, Alphabet did not mention tariffs, trade risk, or related cost impacts during its Q1 2025 earnings call.
One critical unanswered policy question is whether higher tariffs on imported data center components advance or undermine the Trump administration’s objective of accelerating American AI infrastructure development. At minimum, the administration’s inconsistent tariff approach complicates companies’ ability to plan long-term strategies, increasing uncertainty and potentially driving higher costs or delays in infrastructure deployment.
Another issue is that not all capital investments are created equal. With high tariffs and component costs, $10 billion today may not buy what it did a year ago. So we might still see big spending numbers, but companies might only get nine instead of ten data centers.
And these investments don’t just happen in the US. Higher tariffs could prompt American cloud companies to shift more of their capital investments abroad. However, these decisions will hinge significantly on the Trump administration’s approach to export controls on advanced AI chips. In other words, while tariffs might push cloud investments overseas to cut costs, tighter export controls on advanced AI chips could pull companies back toward the US, creating strategic uncertainty for American tech companies. (new paragraph) It’s also worth watching how other countries respond. European providers like France’s OVHCloud, which recently announced €193 million in investment for the first half of its 2025 fiscal year (September through February), may benefit from a higher-tariff environment, especially if US tariffs prompt governments to favor domestic or regional infrastructure over US-owned clouds.
Though OVHCloud’s investment pales beside US companies, other European providers and European governments are boosting spending on cloud and AI infrastructure, which could potentially dampen future spending by US companies.
For now, however, these companies remain committed to massive investments. For them, it’s not a wait-and-see moment. Instead, they’re in build-now-and-keep-building mode , pushing forward despite tariffs and other government-generated risks.
Pablo Chavez is an Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Center for a New American Security’s Technology and National Security Program and a technology policy expert. He has held public policy leadership positions at Google, LinkedIn, and Microsoft and has served as a senior staffer in the US Senate.
Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions expressed on Bandwidth are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
European Union digital regulations are spreading across the globe. CEPA is mapping where similar rules have been adopted or are under consideration, starting with the Digital Markets Act.
The post Tariffs and Tech: An Uncertain Recipe appeared first on CEPA.
2025-05-10 00:17:44
President Trump’s administration is reportedly ready to impose wide-ranging tariffs on semiconductors. Not just China or finished foreign chips are targeted. Potential so-called component tariffs would add up the value of foreign-made chips inside a device and tariff the finished device.
Put aside the question of whether such a complex scheme is practical (serious analysts have doubts), tariffs could hurt Europe, reducing sales of its own cutting-edge chips and slowing chip investments on the continent. The best European response would not be to counterattack with its own chip subsidies. It would be to partner with China, and if needed, retaliate with taxes on a broad range of US digital products.
Let’s look first at the potential direct impact. European chip exports to the US will suffer little. Europe only accounts for 8% of global chip production, and most of that is destined for the European automotive industry rather than consumer electronics assembled in Asia.
Europe’s real strength – and vulnerability — is producing the machines essential to making cutting edge chips. The leading Dutch lithography equipment manufacturer ASML will suffer. Although the company plans to shift the “lion’s share” of tariff costs to US customers, it already predicts slowing orders due to uncertainty about the impact of a trade war. ASML customers, including Intel, TSMC, and Samsung are postponing equipment purchases due to overcapacity in non-AI chips.
Another affected European strength is chip design. Reporting its fourth-quarter results, British chip designer Arm warned that uncertainty around US tariff policies made it unable to give guidance for annual revenue, with its main customers such as Nvidia and Apple facing shocks to their supply chain.
Reciprocal European tariffs on US-manufactured chips and equipment make little sense. Europeans already produce their own chipmaking equipment, or use Nikon of Japan, and consume chips mostly made in Asia.
Before looking at solutions, what problems, if any, do the expected tariffs create for Europe? Apart from ASML, US and Asian suppliers could rush to invest in the US to get inside the tariff wall — potentially reducing semiconductor investment in Europe.
But is this really a problem to be solved, or more of an opportunity to be exploited? Europe’s Chip Act aims to boost production to 20% of global market share. That’s misguided — so maybe this is an opportunity to focus on more realistic goals.
Since Asian semiconductor capacity is likely to face lower demand from the US due to tariffs, this could mean overcapacity and lower prices, and hence an opportunity for the European electronics industry to take advantage and invest in local production. Tariffs are likely to make the US less competitive by isolating it from global supply chains — Europe, including the UK, can fill the vacuum with key innovations, especially in design, compound and low-power chips where it is strong.
Instead of making China an enemy, Europe and the UK should leverage the huge Chinese production capacity in electronics and artificial intelligence innovations to its advantage. European consumers and industry will benefit while their US counterparts will suffer.
If Europe wants to consider counter tariffs as a political gesture and/or revenue-raising measure, asymmetric targets will yield better results than singling out the US semiconductor industry. Facebook and Google’s data collection on European and British consumers remains largely untaxed. Since no comparable European services exist that the Trump administration can retaliate against, taxes on US tech could be a revenue-raising response.
If Facebook and Google choose to pass these taxes onto their customers, that will be their loss, and China’s TikTok’s gain. Let’s hope that these risks make the Trump administration pull back from counterproductive chip tariffs.
Christopher Cytera CEng MIET is a Non-resident senior fellow with the Tech Policy Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis and a technology business executive with over 30 years’ experience in semiconductors, electronics, communications, video, and imaging.
Christopher Cytera CEng MIET is a Non-resident senior fellow with the Tech Policy Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis and a technology business executive with over 30 years’ experience in semiconductors, electronics, communications, video, and imaging.
Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions expressed on Bandwidth are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
European Union digital regulations are spreading across the globe. CEPA is mapping where similar rules have been adopted or are under consideration, starting with the Digital Markets Act.
The post US Chip Tariffs: How Might Europe Respond? appeared first on CEPA.
2025-05-09 23:46:52
Speaking in Washington on May 7, Vice President J.D. Vance reassured the many Europeans in the room that the US and Europe are “on the same civilizational team,” adding, “it’s completely ridiculous to think that you’re ever going to be able to drive a firm wedge between the United States and Europe.”
Unlike the Vice President’s comments at the Munich Security Conference in February, which left Europeans anxious, this time the audience responded with applause as he left the stage.
Former Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis, who was at the meeting, said, “we were surprised, positively. The tone has altered. J.D. Vance now considers Europe and the US to be important partners.”
To some, the Vice President’s positive tone may have come as a surprise, but his comments are part of a recent, and very important, shift in approach to Europe and Russia from US officials, including most notably President Donald Trump.
While too early to know for certain, Vance made it clear things have changed when he said the US believes the Russians “are asking for too much” in their negotiations with Ukraine. That signals the US is unlikely to accept the Kremlin’s demands, as many in Europe had feared.
The shift began at Pope Francis’ funeral in April, with the iconic image of Trump and his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelenskyy locked in discussion on gilded chairs in the middle of St. Peter’s Basilica.
Since then, the US and Ukraine have signed a critical minerals deal — the first bilateral economic agreement under the second Trump Administration. Kyiv and Washington called the deal historic, and the US side showed a strong commitment to the negotiation process. The White House underlined the broader significance of the deal, saying it “sends a strong message to Russia — the United States has skin in the game and is committed to Ukraine’s long-term success.”
Since then, there have been defense agreements with Ukraine on F-16 jets and Patriot missile systems.
Trump has grown increasingly impatient with Russia’s escalating attacks on Ukrainian civilians and Putin’s unwillingness to seriously engage in peace talks. The president’s cry of “Vladimir STOP!” was both a rebuke to Putin and a recognition of Russia’s untrustworthiness. He later told ABC that Putin wants all of Ukraine and said the Russian leader may be “tapping” him along to keep the war going.
Taken together, these remarks and actions from the US should give the Europeans and Ukrainians reasons for optimism. And perhaps more importantly, an opportunity to learn a few important lessons.
Lesson 1: If you want to have a seat at the table, you have to show up, engage, and deliver on your promises. For too long, Europe has not taken responsibility for its own defense and security. That is starting to change, but still far too slowly. If Europe wants to alter the perspectives of the US and the rest of the world, the best thing it can do is show it is a powerhouse both in terms of defense capability and economic weight.
There is a long way to go on both fronts. Complaining about the US, which seems to be the comfort zone for many Europeans, isn’t going to get much done. And the European countries that understand this and adopt a pragmatic approach, like the UK, which just negotiated a trade deal with the US, will reap the benefits. Those that disengage won’t.
Lesson 2: Take note of Ukraine’s successful negotiation with the Trump Administration on critical minerals. While many were lamenting that the first leaked version of the deal was deeply unfavorable to Ukraine, the Ukrainians understood it was the initial proposition in a business negotiation with the expectation it would be revised in the process. They took it as such and came out with a good deal.
Lesson 3: Remember recent history and give the US Administration time to shape its policy. Every US Administration since the end of the Cold War has come in with the intent of “resetting” the US-Russia relationship, but every US President, despite their best efforts, ended up with a worse relationship with Moscow. There is one very clear reason for this: There are no deals to be had with Putin, who sees US global power as the ultimate obstacle to achieving his goals in Ukraine and beyond. The Russian leader is not a man who cares about rules; he cares about power and, in the defining war he chose to wage, about victory.
Lesson 4: Recall that the current tensions in US-Europe relations are not new. During the invasion of Iraq under George W. Bush, Americans were despised in Europe. A friend recently recalled being spat on while on a business trip in Europe just for being American. And while many Europeans seemed to love Barack Obama, it was his administration that began the pivot to Asia and led the expansive, but ultimately unsuccessful, reset with Russia. Obama never formally abandoned that policy, even after Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014. It took previous US administrations years to define their policies, and this White House has only had 100 days.
The US is a global power engaged on multiple fronts, including but not limited to tariff disputes, Chinese advances, the Ukraine war, fighting in the Middle East, the Iran nuclear dispute, and a widening conflict between India and Pakistan. It is always hard for an administration to find sufficient bandwidth for global affairs, but the current agenda is overwhelming. If Europeans want priority treatment, they will have to fight for it and earn it.
We must be honest that US-Europe relations have been badly bruised by recent exchanges, but a common front against Russia now appears possible.
Dr. Alina Polyakova is President and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) as well as the Donald Marron Senior Fellow at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
Military experts explain why US bases in Europe matter.
The post US Offers Europe a Warmer Embrace appeared first on CEPA.
2025-05-09 21:13:56
The annual May 9 military parade means a lot to Putin. It has become a central element of his ideology, distorting the memory of the Great Patriotic War and repurposing it for modern use.
By Putin’s account, the Soviet defensive struggle against Hitler’s attack defines modern Russia and paints his own rule as a continuation of a permanent struggle against external threats.
Just as in 1941, Putin’s Russia describes itself as constantly menaced by enemies who spend morning, noon, and night working to harm Russia.
Every negative development and every failure in Putin’s Russia is, therefore, the result of external influences. Every criticism of Putin is whispered and guided by enemy agents. Jealous and hostile powers begrudge Russia its many qualities and blessings and seek to wipe it from the map.
Putin is prolonging the Great Patriotic War and the victory against Hitlerite expansionism into a new fight against what he terms fascism. This new fascism is unrelated to our understanding of the word. Indeed, its characteristics uncannily mirror Putin’s own regime and suggest his understanding of the word is its precise opposite. After all, fascism is founded on “extreme militaristic nationalism, contempt for electoral democracy and political and cultural liberalism, a belief in natural social hierarchy and the rule of elites,” an economy coopted by the government, and the forced submission of the individual to the state.
Putin’s use of the word fascist is, therefore, no more than a label for those he disdains and a useful echo of the Communist regime’s wartime language. In this hall of mirrors, Putin is the supreme anti-fascist, and his opponents are fascists in the mold of Hitler.
The imagery and language of the Great Patriotic War are also employed to glorify a typically Russian cult of death and sacrifice. The more victims there are in his own ranks, the more valuable and precious is the ultimate victory. By that bleak standard, the almost 1 million Russian soldiers killed and wounded in his all-out invasion of Ukraine are an achievement rather than a national disgrace.
With this pernicious ideology, Putin appropriates the defense and sacrifices of the Soviet Union in World War II solely for Russia and makes no allowance for the other combatant nations and victors.
Historically, however, other nations did fight and contributed armies of millions and untold supplies of armaments to the Soviet Union. As for the Soviet victims (who may total 50 million), most were in what is now Ukraine and Belarus.
Many Ukrainians, Belarusians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kyrgyz, Tajiks, Georgians, Armenians, Jews, Tatars, and others fought in the Red Army during World War II. The ideological appropriation by Russians and Russia alone is historically wrong and slightly obscene.
The most perfidious part of Putin’s ideology is the instrumentalization of defense to justify attack.
Having suffered so grievously during the war (albeit in part because of Stalin’s incompetence; Soviet intelligence warned 47 times of the attack in the 10 days before its launch), the Soviet Union concluded that any future conflict would have to be fought outside its own territory.
That 80-year-old conclusion has put a critical card in Putin’s hands for use whenever he judges it best. By claiming that an attack on Russia is imminent, he can always justify an attack on neighboring countries as “defense.”
Yet there are risks and costs in this. Repurposing Great Patriotic War ideology for his own 21st-century purposes, Putin has inflated his imperial war of aggression against Ukraine into an existential question. Either Russia wins and subjugates Ukraine, or Russia’s existence is supposedly at stake. And if the war is going badly, only he can be blamed by ordinary Russians.
The lie at the heart of Putin’s war of aggression on Ukraine is that Russia might die in 2025 at the hands of an enemy that failed in 1941. The plain truth? That if Russia withdrew, the country could continue to live normally, peacefully, and undisturbed, though possibly with someone other than Putin in the Kremlin.
Nico Lange is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA.). He is also a Senior Fellow at the Munich Security Conference in Berlin and Munich, and is Chair of Military History at the University of Potsdam and at the Hertie School of Governance.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
Military experts explain why US bases in Europe matter.
The post Putin’s New Enemy at the Gates? Same as the Old Enemy appeared first on CEPA.
2025-05-09 02:31:25
“It’s really important for us to recognize that this Axis of Aggressors poses a threat to the free world, and we should act accordingly,” said McMaster, who was President Trump’s National Security Advisor 2017-2018, when asked what policymakers underestimate when it comes to Europe.
In a Q&A with the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), McMaster underlined the importance of forward US basing in Europe, warned that scaling back would embolden authoritarian rivals, and argued that deterring future conflict requires a forward presence, not false choices between theaters.
CEPA: How would you assess the operational impact of losing access to key air and naval hubs like Poznan, Ramstein, Lakenheath, or Rota in terms of US power projection?
McMaster: It could be devastating, both for our ability to deter conflict and to respond to crises. In 2017, when some members of the Trump administration were making an argument for retrenchment and disengagement from Europe, I brought President Trump an analysis of our immediate military response after the mass murder attacks of 9/11.
In it, I showed him the contrast between how rapidly we were able to respond and begin active operations against the forces of the Taliban and the Taliban government just a month later, and how long it would have taken if we didn’t have those bases to project power.
It’s important to remember that it’s not only the bases, but it’s also the equipment that you can position forward, and it’s the overflight rights that allow you to project power quickly.
CEPA: How do forward deployments on NATO’s Eastern flank contribute to broader US security objectives?
McMaster: I think we all should know by this point that Vladimir Putin will take whatever he can get. What he’s engaged in is what the historians Jakub Grygiel and Wess Mitchell called in their fantastic book Unquiet Frontier a strategic behavior called probing. Probing at the far reaches of American power, and wherever they assess that there’s an opportunity, they’ll exploit that opportunity.
We’ve seen that time and time again. Certainly, we’ve seen it from the use of Russian new generation warfare and efforts to accomplish their objectives, through political subversion, and other actions that fall below the threshold of what might elicit a concerted military response, such as the 2007 attacks on Estonia.
But also, we’ve seen it happen physically, with the invasion of Georgia in 2008, the first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, and the illegal annexation of Crimea. We’ve seen it in the Black Sea. When we pulled our ships out of the Black Sea, Russia tried to transform it into a Russian lake. It’s important to contest Russia on what the geo-strategists of the late 19th century Mackinder and Spykman called the Rimland.
CEPA: How might Russia and China interpret a significant US troop withdrawal or base closure in Europe?
McMaster: They would interpret it, I think, in the same way they saw other US actions that, in their eyes, portrayed weakness. It’s really important to remember that the first invasion of Ukraine came directly after the unenforced red line in Syria [in 2013], when President Obama chose not to respond militarily to the use of the most heinous weapons on Earth: sarin gas, and other chemical weapons to commit mass murder against civilians.
I think it’s also important to remember that the second massive reinvasion of Ukraine in February of 2022 followed the humiliating self-defeat and deadly withdrawal from Kabul in August 2021.
I think the real lesson is that weakness, and the perception of weakness, is what provokes Putin.
CEPA: Given the US’s strategic pivot towards the Indo-Pacific, how do you see the role of US bases in Europe evolving over the next decade?
McMaster: We have a relatively modest number of troops stationed in Europe, which gives us the ability to rapidly reinforce them. There have been a number of war games, most of them classified, some unclassified, that have highlighted the need to keep improving our ability to deploy rapidly to prevent war or to respond to aggression.
It’s also very important to recognize that Europe has been the object of a shadow war that Russia has been carrying out since its massive reinvasion of Ukraine. This involves assassinations. It involves attacks on infrastructure, including rail lines and warehouses, and the cutting of undersea cables.
These actions, along with the massive cyberattacks Russia has conducted, should help us recognize that it will take whatever it can get, and that it will only be deterred if we demonstrate the range of capabilities and the capacity to deny it the ability to accomplish its objectives, whether through force or through various forms of subversion.
CEPA: In these current rebalancing discussions, what risks or realities do you think policymakers or the public are underestimating when it comes to Europe?
McMaster: It’s actually kind of silly, the whole thing, because it’s defining the competition with China as occurring exclusively in the geographic area of the Indo-Pacific, from the South Pacific to Northeast Asia. Some of the prescriptions are for everybody to kind of run to the Taiwan Strait, like they’re playing little kids’ soccer, when in fact this is a global competition.
It’s a global competition because there has been a coalescing of this Axis of Aggressors. Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have declared their partnership with no limits, and they’ve made clear their intention to forge a new era of international relations. What they mean by that is that they’d be in charge and the free world would be done. It would be over. They would rewrite the rules of international discourse in favor of their authoritarian forms of government, and in favor of China’s mercantilist, statist economic model. And if they succeed, the world would be less free, less prosperous and less safe.
China is underwriting Russia’s assault on Europe and in Ukraine. I think you could argue that China is fighting a proxy war against Europe through Ukraine; by feeding Putin’s ATM with the money they’re paying for Russian energy, and by supplying the hardware, equipment, and electronics necessary for Putin to sustain his war-making machine and continue the onslaught against the Ukrainians.
China also provides cover for Russia in various forms, including from an informational perspective, or with their wolf warriors who parrot the nonsense that this Russian war is somehow based on the Kremlin security concerns, Ukrainian Nazis, or the enlargement of NATO. We should be pretty clear-eyed about the interconnected nature of the challenges that Russia and China — two revanchist, revisionist powers on the Eurasian landmass — pose.
And we should also be cognizant of the fact that they’ve pulled in two other hostile authoritarian regimes: Iran and North Korea. North Korean troops, obviously, fighting alongside Russians in the first major land war in Europe since World War II. I mean, that should have garnered a hell of a lot more attention and outrage.
Also, you have Iran providing Shahed drones and North Korea providing maybe eight million rounds of artillery, as well as missiles, to Russia. The estimates are that it equates to about $20bn worth of support from North Korea, a very poor country. So they’re all in in their support of Russia.
What are those two countries getting in return? They’re getting technical assistance, obviously, for their military, their missile programs, and I think for sure, their nuclear programs as well.
It’s really important for us to recognize that this Axis of Aggressors poses a threat to the free world, and we should act accordingly. We shouldn’t be diminishing our commitment in one area — Europe, for example — so that we can all run over to the Indo-Pacific. Because all that will do is create opportunities for the aggressor on the continent where we have very important interests, in terms of our common principles and values, but also just trade relationships.
The people who argue myopically for this disengagement from Europe to prioritize the competition with China, I think they’re misguided.
Interview conducted by Mila Tanghe of CEPA’s editorial staff.
Mila Tanghe attended Columbia University and is currently an Intern with the Editorial team at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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